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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No, 880161 
Priority No. 1 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from judgment and conviction for Capital Homicide, 
a capital offense, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (1953 
as amended), and Aggravated Kidnapping, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1953 as amended), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding. Pursuant to 
the Order of this Court dated February 20, 1991 granting 
"Appellants Motion to Hear and Decide Transcript Issues and Stay 
Briefing of Other Issues," this brief covers only those issues 
relating to the adequacy of the transcript in the instant case. 
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TRANSCRIPT CITES 
There are forty-five volumes of transcript in this case. 
Throughout his appellate briefs, Mr. Menzies will refer to the 
volumes from the new trial proceedings by record cite as follows: 
1164 December 4, 1989 Motion for New 
Trial 
1934 February 6, 1990 
1166 March 9, 1990 evidentiary hearing 
(new trial) 
1185 March 23, 1990 evidentiary hearing 
1935 May 10, 1990 
1936 June 4, 1990 
1186 July 6, 1990 clarification of 
ruling 
1188 September 17, 1990 
1189 September 24, 1990 
1190 October 22, 1990 
1191 November 7, 1990 
November 15, 1990 
1931 December 3, 4 and 5, 1990 
reconstruction hearing 
R. 1932 December 19, 1990 
The notereader prepared the volumes of transcript 
covering the actual trial. There are eleven volumes which are 
numbered 1 through 3275. These volumes are the original transcript 
certified by Ms. Lee. The trial judge labeled them as the "original 
ix 
transcript" and throughout this brief, Mr. Menzies refers to them as 
the "original transcript" or original version. 
During the proceedings in California, Ms Lee read from 
her shorthand notes while defense counsel and a representative for 
the State read along from copies of the original version. The 
representatives noted any discrepancies between the shorthand notes 
and the original version by writing in changes on the original 
version. The eleven volumes of transcript wherein defense counsel 
denoted the discrepancies is also part of the official record in 
this case and contains transcript pages 1 through 3275. 
The trial court labeled these volumes containing 
discrepancies which are written in by hand as the "California" 
transcript. Mr. Menzies refers to these volumes throughout his 
briefs as the California version or transcript. 
A cite to T. in this brief is a cite to a transcript page 
in the California version. Mr. Menzies7 arguments can best be 
understood by referring to the California version. 
A cite to O.T. is a cite to the original transcript. 
The following volumes of transcript also exist: 
R. 1165 May 16, 1986 lineup proceedings 
R. 1164 January 11, 1988 Motion for 
Discovery 
R. 1149 February 18 and 19, 1988 Walter 
Britton's testimony (transcribed 
during trial) 
R. 1150 May 19, 1988 preliminary hearing 
transcript 
x 
R. 1163 November 20-21, 1988 Motion to 
Suppress 
R. 1196 January 25, 1988 and March 3, 1988 
Motion for Discovery, other motions 
R. 567 Dr. Sweeney preliminary hearing 
R. 1163 November 7, 1986 evidentiary 
hearing on Motion to Suppress, 
Carlton Way transcript 
xi 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, : Case No. 880161 
Priority No. 1 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(h) (1953 as amended); see also Rule 26(2) (a) 
and (b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
See Addendum A for text of statutes, rules and 
constitutional provisions. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Do the Court Reporters and Stenographers Act and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) require that a transcript be prepared by a 
Utah certified court reporter or that the parties stipulate to the 
use of an uncertified reporter in order to use a transcript prepared 
by an uncertified individual for mandatory review of a capital 
homicide case? 
2. Is mandatory review impossible since an accurate, 
verbatim transcript does not exist? 
a) Does the State have the burden of establishing 
the accuracy of the transcript? 
b) Is either the "California" or "original" version 
an accurate, verbatim reflection of what occurred in the 
trial court? 
c) Is reversal required since an adequate 
transcript for mandatory review is not available? 
3. Is prejudice required, and, if so, did it exist in 
this case? 
4. Would the eighth and fourteenth amendments be 
violated by use of either version of the transcript? 
5. Would Mr. Menzies7 right to appeal under the Utah 
Constitution be violated by use of either version of the transcript? 
6. Would Mr. Menzies' right to due process and equal 
protection under the Utah Constitution be violated by use of the 
transcript? 
7. Would use of either version of the transcript violate 
Mr. Menzies7 rights to due process, equal protection, and effective 
assistance under the federal constitution? 
8. Did ex parte supplementation of the record by the 
prosecutor violate Utah statutory and constitutional rights and 
federal constitutional rights? 
These issues involve questions of law for 
this court; a correction of error standard is 
applicable. See State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 
326, 327 (Utah 1989). The trial judge's 
factual finding that numerous errors exist and 
other factual findings underlying his 
conclusions are given deference. See State v. 
Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Amended Information dated March 7, 1986, the State 
charged Mr. Menzies with Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery 
- 2 -
and Habitual Criminal, all first degree felonies, and Capital 
Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital offense.1 
Mr. Menzies filed a timely Notice of appeal directly 
appealing his convictions and sentence to this Court. R. 1108. On 
November 15, 1989, prior to filing his opening brief, Mr. Menzies 
filed a "Motion to Set Aside Judgment and/or for New Trial" in the 
trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the transcript of 
proceedings prepared in this case did not accurately reflect what 
occurred in court and was not adequate for review of this capital 
homicide case. R. 1222-1226; see Addendum B for copy of 
Mr. Menzie's Motion. 
On January 3, 1990, this Court ordered that the trial 
court hear and decide Defendant7s Motion to Set Aside 
Judgment . . . , conduct proceedings pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah 
Rules of the Supreme Court2, and decide all issues relating to the 
1 The aggravating circumstances alleged as part of the 
capital homicide charge which were submitted to the jury were that 
"the homicide was committed while the actor was engaged in the 
commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, 
or attempting to commit: Aggravated Robbery and/or Robbery and 
Aggravated Kidnapping and/or Kidnapping." R. 51-54; 845. The jury 
found Mr. Menzies guilty of Capital Homicide with the aggravating 
circumstances that the homicide was committed while in the 
commission of a robbery and an aggravated kidnapping. R. 898. The 
jury also convicted Mr. Menzies of Aggravated Kidnapping but found 
him not guilty of Aggravated Robbery. R. 899, 900. 
The original transcript incorrectly reported a guilty 
verdict on the Aggravated Robbery charge. The error has been 
corrected by stipulation of the parties. T. 2693. 
2
 These rules have since been changed to the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. 
- 3 -
transcript and court reporter. See Addendum C.3 
On June 4, 1990, the trial judge issued a ruling which 
was not clear to the parties.4 R. 1704; R. 1936:3-23. Thereafter, 
the trial judge issued a Memorandum Decision clarifying his ruling. 
R. 1724-8. A copy of this Memorandum Decision is contained in 
Addendum D.5 
On December 3, 1990, the court held an evidentiary 
hearing during which Mr. Menzies presented evidence regarding the 
errors in the transcript and the prejudicial effect of such errors. 
R. 1931:16-183. The State presented no evidence at that hearing. 
R. 1931:183. 
On December 19, 1991, the parties and the trial judge 
attempted to reconstruct what occurred in the more than 3 300 pages 
of transcript. The parties and the judge ultimately agreed that the 
attempts to reconstruct the record were futile and that Mr. Menzies 
3
 On December 8, 1989, Mr. Menzies filed in this Court 
his proposed modifications pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Supreme Court. Mr. Menzies' proposals, the State's response 
thereto, and Mr. Menzies7 reply were later resubmitted to the trial 
court and decided by the trial judge. R. 1829-40. A second round 
of proposed modifications was submitted on December 17, 1990. 
R. 1818-26. 
4
 On June 8, 1990, after the trial judge ruled, 
Mr. Menzies filed a Motion to Reconsider Ruling (R. 1705-9, 
1718-23). Following various hearings in the trial court, 
Mr. Menzies also filed an additional Memorandum in Support of his 
Motion . . . for New Trial. R. 1572-1607. 
5
 The trial court ordered that a representative from 
each party travel to California to meet with the court reporter and 
go over her shorthand notes. R. 1776, 1778. The representatives 
spent three weeks reviewing the notes and inserting discrepancies 
between those notes and the original version in the original version 
of the transcript. R. 1931:26. Although Ms. Lee was sworn when she 
testified, she was never sworn as part of the notereading process. 
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had made all reasonable efforts to reconstruct the proceedings. 
R. 1932:78-9, 82; R. 1192-3. 
The trial court denied Defendant's Motion for New Trial 
and sent two sets of transcripts to this Court. The Order stated: 
1. Defendant's Renewed Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment and/or for New Trial is denied. 
2. The original transcript, prepared 
by the notereader, shall be transmitted to the 
Utah Supreme Court based upon the finding that 
transcript is sufficiently accurate to afford 
defendant a full and fair review of his issues 
to be raised on appeal. 
3. The California transcript, 
interlineated by defendant's counsel and 
containing Ms. Tauni Lee's version of her 
reporter notes, shall also be transmitted to 
the Utah Supreme Court as part of the record on 
appeal. 
R. 1192-3. See Addendum E for a copy of the Order. 
Pursuant to an Order of this Court dated February 20, 
1991, Mr. Menzies is raising in this brief only issues relating to 
the adequacy of the transcript. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. THE TRANSCRIPT ISSUE 
Tauni Lee, the court reporter assigned to Judge Uno's 
courtroom at the time of this trial (February 10 through March 23, 
1988), was appointed as Judge Uno's official reporter on January 14, 
1988, twenty-seven days before this trial began. See Defendant's 
Exhibit 4; R. 1166:29. Ms. Lee had never applied for nor been 
licensed to act as a court reporter in the State of Utah. 
R. 1166:9, 138, 158; Affidavit of George Weiler, Defendant's Exhibit 
(hereinafter "D.E.") 1; R. 1166:29, 31. (Addendum F) 
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In April, 1987, ten months before the trial in the 
present case, Ms. Lee's California license expired and became 
delinquent. D.E. 2, Affidavit of Rick Black (contained in 
Addendum G). 6 
During the six months prior to Ms. Lee's employment in 
district court, she resided in Utah, working for two weeks as a 
temporary secretary at Brigham Young University and later as private 
reporter for Associated Merit Court Reporters. R. 1166:106, 131-5, 
182-30; 1185:15. 
Linda Van Tassell, the owner of Associated Merit and a 
recognized court reporter with numerous credentials including her 
current position as president of the Utah Association of Court 
Reporters, testified that Ms. Lee worked at Associated Merit for 
approximately six weeks as a freelance court reporter from early 
September to October 15, 1987. R. 1185:5-6, 14-15. Ms. Lee did 
nine jobs for Ms. Van Tassell; the quality was so poor in each case 
that Ms. Van Tassell sent every product back to Ms. Lee for 
corrections. R. 1185:15-6. The problems with Ms. Lee's work 
encompassed difficulties in taking accurate notes as well as in 
reading those notes after taking them. R. 1185:17. The transcripts 
6
 The number "6770" which Ms. Lee included in each of 
the "certifications" contained in the original transcript is not a 
number issued by the State of Utah and was the number issued to her 
by the State of California in July, 1985. R. 1166:99, 12, 123; 
D.E. 2. See Addendum G. 
In November, 1987, Ms. Lee obtained a non-tested R.P.R. 
designation; the issuing agency gave this designation to her based 
upon her California license even though the California license was 
delinquent and had lapsed at the time Ms. Lee obtained the R.P.R. 
certificate. R. 1673; D.E. 2. 
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prepared by Ms. Lee contained "total inconsistent errors throughout" 
and customers complained about the quality of the work. 
R. 1185:16-17. 
According to Ms. Van Tassell, Ms. Lee's work was so poor 
that she was not capable of reporting a capital homicide case 
(R. 1185:20); Ms. Van Tassell told Ms. Lee that she would never make 
it as a court reporter. R. 1166:133; R. 1185:20-1. 
After Ms. Lee was fired from the job in Third District 
Court in September, 1988, she applied for employment with Rocky 
Mountain Court Reporters; she did not tell Rocky Mountain that she 
had worked in Third District Court. R. 1185:45-6. 
Ms. Lee covered three depositions for Rocky Mountain. 
R. 1166:48. Ms. Lee prepared the first transcript from a videotaped 
deposition of a doctor; it contained such significant errors and 
omissions when compared to the videotape that Rocky Mountain 
terminated her. R. 1185:46, 47, 49, 50. The transcript was redone 
by another reporter and was ten to fifteen percent longer when 
corrected by the other reporter. R. 1185:48,49.7 
Although Susan Hellberg Young, the president of Rocky 
Mountain, was a reluctant witness for Mr. Menzies who appeared 
pursuant to a subpoena, she nevertheless testified that knowing what 
she did about Ms. Lee's work, she would not have her report a 
7
 When Rocky Mountain terminated Ms. Lee, she had not 
yet completed transcripts from the other two depositions she had 
taken. R. 1185:49. Ms. Young had difficulty getting the two 
transcripts from Ms. Lee; Ms. Lee ultimately "skipped town" and 
Rocky Mountain was forced to use a notereader to prepare the other 
two transcripts. R. 1185:49. 
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capital homicide case. R. 1185:53. 
On April 13, 1988, after the trial in the instant case 
had occurred, but before the transcripts were prepared, California 
declared Ms. Lee incompetent to act as a court reporter in that 
state. R. 1166:66-7; D.E. 2; D.E. 5, 9 (contained in Addendum H). 
That declaration of incompetency has never been lifted, and the 
State of California has recently revoked Ms. Lee's license to act as 
a court reporter in that state. R. 1166:66; D.E. 2, 3, 4 from 
December 3, 1990 hearing (Addendum I). Orders to Show Cause and 
sanctions were issued against Ms. Lee in at least four other cases. 
Id.; R. 1845.8 
By May 11, 1988, Ron Gibson, Deputy Court Administrator 
for the State of Utah, was aware that Ms. Lee had been declared 
incompetent by the California court. D.E. 11; R. 1166:65-6. 
On May 17, 1988, Mr. Gibson sent a memorandum to various 
people in the judicial system, informing them that Ms. Lee had told 
Geoffrey Butler, the clerk of this Court, that it would take her 
nine months to complete the transcript in the present case and that 
she planned to resign in the next two months and move to Europe with 
her husband. R. 1166:67; D.E. 6 (Addendum J). The memorandum also 
indicated that a number of people had expressed a "grave concern11 
about Ms. Lee's ability to complete the transcript, and that all 
8
 Ms. Lee ultimately prepared the transcripts in those 
four cases during the period of time in which the court 
administrator's office had placed her on leave, in violation of 
judicial council rule, to prepare the transcripts in the present 
case. R. 1166:69, 179. 
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efforts, including the suspension of administrative rules, should be 
made to insure that Ms. Lee completed the transcript. Id.9 
As the result of concerns about Ms. Lee completing the 
Menzies transcripts, the Court Administrator's office placed Ms. Lee 
on administrative leave for the weeks of May 23, June 6, June 20, 
July 4, and July 15, 1988, so that she could work full time during 
those weeks on preparation of the Menzies transcripts. She 
continued to receive her full salary while on leave. R. 1166:69, 
70.10 
On August 10, 1988, in response to a request by Ms. Lee 
for an extension of time in which to file the transcripts in this 
case, Geoff Butler wrote Ms. Lee a letter indicating that if she did 
not complete the Menzies transcript by September 6, 1988, she was to 
appear in this Court for an Order to Show Cause hearing on that 
date. R. 1166:78; D.E. 13. 
On August 29, 1988, in a letter signed by Judge Uno and 
Timothy Shea, Ms. Lee was informed of the "increased concern 
surrounding [her] ability to complete the transcript of State v. 
9
 Ms. Lee estimated at that time, based on the length of 
her shorthand notes, that the transcript would be approximately 5000 
pages. R. 1166:68; Addendum J. The transcript ultimately filed by 
her was approximately 3 3 00 pages. 
1 0
 The deadline with this Court for filing the 
transcripts was July 23, 1988, and the administrative leave plan was 
instituted in an effort to meet that deadline. R. 1166:72. On 
May 23, 1988, Ms. Lee informed Ron Gibson that she had broken her 
finger doing karate with her husband and would need to be on sick 
leave for three weeks through June 10, 1988. R. 1166:72-3; D.E. 8. 
At about the same time, Ron Gibson assigned a temporary court 
reporter to Judge Uno's courtroom. R. 1166:73. 
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Menzies in a timely manner." R. 1166:75; D.E. 14 (Addendum K ) . 1 1 
At that time, Ms. Lee was relieved of her assignment to 
Judge Uno until she completed the transcript in this case. 
R. 1166:75. She was ordered to report to the Court Administrator's 
office and work under the direct supervision of Ron Gibson until the 
transcript was complete. R. 1166:75-6; see D.E. 14 (Addendum K). 
On August 30, 1988, Ron Gibson met with Ms. Lee and 
discussed the difficulties with her job performance. R. 1166:77. 
During that conversation, Ms. Lee informed Mr. Gibson that she was 
close to completing the Menzies transcript, that she needed to work 
at home because she used a computer to prepare the transcript and 
requiring her to move the computer would only result in further 
delay.12 As a result of Ms. Lee's statement, Ron Gibson allowed her 
to continue working at home rather than under his direct 
supervision. R. 1166:77; D.E. 15 (Addendum K). 
By September 7, 1988, Ms. Lee filed the Menzies 
transcripts. She also returned the district court record "which she 
had checked out . . . for the purpose of verifying names and 
1 1
 The letter indicates that she did not appear at the 
courthouse for supervision, had frequent absences when she was 
supposed to be in court, and that her actions had "become an 
unacceptable burden upon your judge, fellow court reporters, and the 
court executive." See Addendum K. Other problems included 
confrontations with court staff and violation of the security 
policy. R. 1166:77; Addendum K containing D.E. 15. 
1 2
 After testifying that a notereader prepared the 
transcripts in this case and that Ms. Lee did not use her computer 
in the preparation of the Menzies transcripts, Ms. Lee denied that 
she had told Ron Gibson that she needed to stay at home because she 
utilized her computer. R. 1166:178. Ron Gibson testified to this 
statement, however, and it is repeated in an official memorandum 
from the Court Administrator's office dated August 30, 1988. 
R. 1166:77; D.E. 15 (Addendum K). 
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dates." Personnel file, D.E. 4. Apparently no one who was involved 
in Ms. Lee's employment supervision checked the transcript for 
accuracy or completeness. R. 1166:85. 
On September 7, 1988, Judge Uno and Timothy Shea sent 
Ms. Lee a letter terminating her employment immediately. 
R. 1166:79; D.E. 16 (Addendum L). 
Following Ms. Lee's termination, defense counsel 
discovered that Ms. Lee had not prepared portions of the record and 
made numerous unsuccessful attempts to locate Ms. Lee prior to 
filing the Motion to Set Aside Judgment in this case. 
R. 1166:66-74. Although Ms. Lee testified under oath that she did 
not know that "Legal Defenders"13 was looking for her 
(R. 1166:169-71), she had spoken to the Legal Defender secretary on 
November 4, 1988, promising to call back that week after checking 
some dates, and had also been told by LaVonne Nadeau, Judge Uno's 
clerk, that Legal Defenders was looking for her. R. 1185:70; 
R. 1485. 
Ms. Lee testified that although she took the notes in 
court, she did not prepare the transcripts which were submitted to 
the court, nor did she read them for accuracy after a notereader and 
proofreader prepared them. R. 1166:108, 174-7, 178. Ms. Lee did 
look at pages that the notereader had paperclipped and made any 
changes that she noticed. She did not thereafter check to make sure 
that the notereader had made her changes, nor did she read the 
entire transcript. R. 1166:173-7. 
13
 Both trial and appellate counsel for Mr. Menzies are 
employed by the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association. 
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B. THE TRIAL 
On the evening of Sunday, February 23, 1986, Maureen 
Hunsaker was working as an attendant at a Gas-A-Mat in Kearns. 
T. 978-9. At a little before 10:00 p.m., a customer discovered that 
Ms. Hunsaker was not present at the booth. T. 1030, 982. Two days 
later, a hiker discovered her body in the Storm Mountain picnic 
area. T. 1304. 
Tim Larabee and Beth Brown were two young people who had 
briefly seen a man and a woman at Storm Mountain on the morning of 
February 24, 1986. T. 1193, 1197-9, 1200-2, 1215. The distance at 
which they viewed the pair is unclear due to the errors in this 
transcript. T. 1198, 1200, 1220. 
Neither Tim nor Beth identified Mr. Menzies as the man 
they had seen at Storm Mountain at the lineup, the preliminary 
hearing, or trial. T. 1276-9.14 At the lineup, Tim and Beth 
identified two different people as being the man they saw. T. 1274, 
1277-8.15 
At trial, Tim claimed that after the lineup, while 
walking with the prosecutor back to the County Attorney's office, he 
asked prosecutor Ernie Jones if he had been wrong and if the right 
person was Number 6. T. 1284-5. Number 6 was Mr. Menzies. T. 1285. 
1 4
 Beth did not testify for the State at trial; the 
defense called her to establish that she had selected someone else 
without hesitation at the lineup. T. 2251. 
1 5
 Neither expressed any hesitation about their lineup 
identifications at the time of the lineup, even though they had been 
instructed that they did not need to select anyone and to indicate 
on the card that they were not sure of the selection if that were 
the case. Transcript of Lineup Proceedings, hereinafter "T.L.P.,11 
12-13; T. 1276-8; T. 2251. 
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The State had not informed defense counsel of this 
incident, even though the lineup occurred prior to the preliminary 
hearing in this case and almost two years before trial. T. 1295, 
1296, 1301. Defense counsel first learned of this conversation when 
Tim testified to it on redirect examination during trial. Id. The 
trial court granted Mr. Menzies' motion to strike the testimony 
(which had already been heard by the jury) but refused to grant his 
motion for mistrial. T. 1299, 1301-2, 1313-4. 
In violation of pretrial orders which precluded evidence 
of Mr. Menzies7 criminal history, Detective Thompson testified 
during direct examination that Mr. Menzies told him that Mr. Menzies 
had gone to the parole office on the day before Ms. Hunsaker's body 
was found. R. 780; T. 1877. Defense counsel made several motions 
for mistrial based on this testimony. T. 1878, 1904, 1922, 1946, 
1948, 2133. Nevertheless, the original version of the transcript 
indicates that Detective Thompson stated "patrol" not "parole." 
T. 1877.16 
Walter Britton, a jail house "snitch," testified against 
Mr. Menzies at the preliminary hearing. T. 2080-84.17 At trial, 
1 6
 This error has been changed by stipulation of the 
parties. An error depicting Officer Iovino as a "parole" officer 
when he is, in fact, a "patrol" officer has also been corrected by 
stipulation to show that Thompson actually stated "parole" office. 
T. 1869, 1877. 
17
 Mr. Britton did not contact authorities until a month 
after the alleged conversation; his testimony did not contain any 
details or information that he could not have gleaned from the 
extensive media coverage of this case; a portion of his statement 
reflected media coverage which had been incorrect. 
In December, 1985, immediately prior to the alleged 
(continued) 
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Mr. Britton was questioned outside the presence of the jury and 
stated that he would not testify. T. 960. However, he answered any 
specific questions asked of him. T. 1081. 
The trial judge determined that Mr. Britton was 
unavailable and, over defense objection, allowed Mr. Britton to be 
returned to prison without appearing in front of the jury; the trial 
judge then allowed Mr. Britton7s testimony from the preliminary 
hearing to be read to the jury by court personnel. T. 2078. 
Various portions of the transcript regarding this issue are 
unintelligible or do not accurately reflect what was said in court. 
See discussion, infra at 27-9; 32-36. 
Numerous other errors occurred during the guilt/innocence 
and penalty phases of Mr. Menzies' trial which require reversal. In 
an effort to give this Court a brief overview of the case, 
Mr. Menzies has attached as Addendum M a draft of the proposed Table 
of Contents in this case, as it currently exists. While Mr. Menzies 
may raise additional issues not listed in this table if ultimately 
required to brief this case in full, the table outlines a number of 
issues for this Court's information. 
After a jury convicted Mr. Menzies of Capital Homicide, 
Mr. Menzies waived the jury for the penalty phase of his trial. 
Judge Uno sentenced Mr. Menzies to death. In constructing the 
(footnote 17 continued) 
conversation with Mr. Menzies, Mr. Britton had undergone a 
court-ordered psychological examination. T. 1081, 2043-4. During 
the twenty months following the preliminary hearing, Mr. Britton 
vacillated several times as to whether he would testify at trial. 
T. 1081-82. 
- 14 -
transcript of the judge's sentencing determination, the notereader 
used the trial judge's handwritten notes which he had reviewed while 
pronouncing judgment to interpret the court reporter's notes. 
R. 1929:46. 
Mr. Menzies has no other homicide convictions, and the 
instant case involves a single homicide. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act and 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) require that a transcript which is to 
be used for mandatory review of a capital homicide conviction and 
sentence be prepared by a Utah certified shorthand reporter. A 
transcript prepared by an individual who is not certified in Utah 
cannot be used for such purposes unless the parties so stipulate. 
No such stipulation exists in this case. 
Point II. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees 
with Mr. Menzies' position in Point I, where a transcript is 
prepared by an individual who is not certified in Utah to act as a 
court reporter, at the very least, the State bears the burden of 
establishing the accuracy of the transcript in order to use it to 
review a capital homicide case. 
Regardless of which party has the burden, the numerous 
significant errors in the transcript prepared by the notereader or 
Ms. Lee establish that neither version accurately reflects what 
occurred in court. 
Without an accurate, verbatim transcript, mandatory 
review of this capital homicide case for plain error is impossible; 
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no further showing of harm is required. 
Point III, Assuming, arguendo, that this Court requires 
a showing of harm, both versions of the transcript are replete with 
errors which are prejudicial. 
Point IV. Mandatory review is an essential component of 
Utah's death penalty scheme. The eighth and fourteenth amendments 
are violated where an accurate, verbatim transcript with which to 
review this case is not available. 
Point V. The lack of an accurate, verbatim transcript 
with which to review this death penalty case violates Mr. Menzies' 
right to appeal under the Utah Constitution. 
Point VI. The use of either version would violate 
Mr. Menzies7 rights to due process and equal protection under the 
Utah Constitution. 
Point VII. The use of either version of the transcript 
would violate Mr. Menzies7 federal constitutional rights to due 
process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel. 
Point VIII. The ex parte supplementation of the record 
by the prosecutor violates various Utah constitutional and statutory 
rights and federal constitutional rights. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT REPORTERS AND STENOGRAPHERS 
ACT AND UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-206(2) PRECLUDE 
THE USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT PREPARED IN THIS CASE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1953 as amended) and Rule 
26(10), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provide for an automatic 
review by this Court of judgment and sentence in cases where a death 
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sentence is imposed. 
Both the statute and rule require the certification of 
the "entire record"; implicit in this requirement is the 
contemplation that this Court must be provided with a verbatim, 
true, accurate, and correct transcript of what occurred in the trial 
court in order to provide for a meaningful review of the judgment 
and sentence. See generally Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. Cr. 
App. 1987); United States v. Workcuff, 422 F.2d 700, 702 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) ("There can be little doubt that the absence of a complete and 
accurate transcript impairs the ability of appellate counsel to 
protect his client's basic rights . . . 'Frequently, issues simply 
cannot even be seen—let alone assessed—without reading an accurate 
transcript.,H). 
The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act ("the Act"), 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-1.1 et seq. requires that official court 
reporters who prepare transcripts for appeals be certified by the 
Utah Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-56-15 (1953 as amended).18 
1 8
 In order to be certified to act as a court reporter 
in Utah, an individual must make written application, include proof 
of qualifications in that application, verify the application, and 
pay appropriate fees. U.C.A. § 58-1-11. The individual must be a 
citizen, at least eighteen years old, of "good moral character," 
possess "a high degree of skill and ability in the art of shorthand 
reporting," and "pass a satisfactory examination as provided in this 
chapter." U.C.A. § 78-56-16. 
The Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
may issue a license without an examination where the person has been 
licensed in another state which has education, experience and 
examination requirements equal to those of Utah. U.C.A. § 58-1-12. 
To be eligible for reciprocal licensing, the individual must produce 
"satisfactory evidence of his identity and good standing in his 
(continued) 
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Tauni Lee, the court reporter assigned to Judge Uno's 
courtroom during the trial of this case, never applied for nor 
obtained a certificate to act as a court reporter in the State of 
Utah. R. 1166:9; D.E. 1, Affidavit of George Weiler, Addendum F. 
The trial judge appropriately found that Ms. Lee had never been 
certified in Utah. R. 1186:5; R. 1725; R. 1936:14.19 
Despite Ms. Lee's lack of certification, the trial judge 
placed the burden on Mr. Menzies "to establish that the record is 
not correct, and that if there are any errors, the errors cannot be 
corrected with due diligence, and further, that such errors are 
prejudicial even after correction." R. 1186:5; R. 1725.20 
Although the Act does not explicitly outline the effect 
of the lack of certification of a court reporter on the 
(footnote 18 continued) 
occupation or profession." Id. Furthermore, such reciprocal 
licensing is not mandatory. See Call v. Billings, 140 P.2d 640 
(Utah 1943) . 
In the present case, Ms. Lee's California license had 
lapsed and become delinquent when she was hired by Third District 
Court, so she would have been unable to produce satisfactory 
evidence of her good standing had she applied in Utah. 
19
 Although Ms. Lee had been licensed in the State of 
California in 1985, that license lapsed and became delinquent in 
April, 1987, ten months before the trial in the instant case began. 
The effect of that delinquent license and Ms. Lee's R.P.R. 
designation are discussed infra at 29-31. 
2 0
 The trial judge initially ruled that the burden of 
establishing the accuracy and completeness of the transcript was on 
both the State and the Defendant. R. 1936:15. The trial judge 
stated, "[b]ecause as I indicated, in this situation here, I think 
that the state would probably have the burden, because both of you 
have brought forth all the arguments for and against." The judge 
then pointed out how difficult it would be for the State to 
establish the accuracy of the transcript, stating, "[t]he only way 
the state can prove the accuracy of the transcript is to have both 
(continued) 
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acceptability for appellate purposes of any transcript prepared by 
that reporter, it does make failure to comply with the Act, or use 
of the designation "C.S.R." by someone who is not certified in Utah 
a misdemeanor.21 The criminal sanctions against reporting without a 
Utah license demonstrate the importance of these licensing 
provisions. 
Furthermore, Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure requires the parties to obtain a certified court reporter 
to transcribe any recorded proceedings where a reporter was not 
present. Pursuant to Rule 11(e), a "person other than a certified 
court transcriber" can be used to transcribe a hearing where no 
reporter was present only "[b]y stipulation of the parties approved 
by the appellate court." Obviously, a stipulation to use a 
noncertified court reporter does not exist in this case. This rule, 
when read in conjunction with the Act, suggests the expectation that 
reporters will be certified, and further suggests that the appellate 
court will not accept as an official transcript a transcript 
prepared by a noncertified person unless the parties so stipulate. 
(footnote 20 continued) 
of you get together to find out what the errors and omissions are." 
Id. The trial judge apparently never thought about, or at least did 
not address, the difficulty of requiring Mr. Menzies to prove a 
negative—that this transcript did not reflect what occurred in 
court. 
After Mr. Menzies filed his motion to reconsider and 
clarify, the judge determined that the burden was on Mr. Menzies. 
R. 1186:5; R. 1725. 
2 1
 Ms. Lee violated both § 78-56-15 and § 78-56-18 when 
she acted as an official reporter without obtaining a Utah license, 
and used the designation "C.S.R." when she "certified" each of the 
volumes of transcript. See, e.g., 517, 1593, 2214. 
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Although there is no Utah case directly discussing the 
effect of lack of certification of a court reporter, cases from 
other jurisdictions provide some guidance. 
In In re David T., 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. 4th App. 
1976), the court reversed a juvenile's criminal conviction where the 
juvenile court used a shorthand reporter who was not a certified 
court reporter to record oral proceedings. The court pointed out 
that: 
the statute [requiring certification of court 
reporters] prescribes the minimum 
qualifications presumed to assure a prima facie 
correct transcript. Less than these 
qualifications supports a contrary presumption 
which renders the certification of the accuracy 
prescribed by statute meaningless. 
Id. at 731. 
In David T., the court also based its decision on the 
fact that a statute explicitly provided that a juvenile could appeal 
his conviction and be provided with a transcript to do so. By 
comparison, in the present case, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) 
explicitly requires the mandatory review of judgment and sentence in 
this case, and that the "entire record" of proceedings be certified 
to the Supreme Court. 
Arkansas requires that a transcript be prepared and 
certified by a reporter licensed in that state in order to use the 
transcript on appeal, unless the parties certify that the transcript 
prepared by the unlicensed person is "true, accurate and complete.11 
Pullan v. Fulbright, 685 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1985). 
In Pullan, the court stated that transcripts which are 
not prepared by a certified reporter "cannot be accepted by the 
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Supreme court." Id. at 152. The court pointed out its intention to 
strictly follow the rule requiring certification of court reporters, 
but because the rule had recently been adopted, the court allowed an 
exception where the parties stipulate that the transcripts are true, 
accurate and correct. 
Pursuant to the Act, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a transcript prepared 
by an uncertified reporter cannot be used for the automatic review 
of this death penalty case unless the parties stipulate to its use. 
In the absence of such a stipulation, an official, certified 
transcript does not exist and this Court is unable to perform its 
mandatory review of this case, requiring reversal. See Delap v. 
State. 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977); Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 
(Okl. 1988); Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1987). 
POINT II. MANDATORY REVIEW IS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE 
AN ACCURATE VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST. 
A. THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING 
THE ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court disagrees with 
Mr. Menzies' assertion in Point I of this brief that the transcript 
prepared in this case cannot be used since it was not prepared by a 
certified court reporter, and the parties did not stipulate to using 
a noncertified reporter, the State nevertheless has the burden of 
establishing the accuracy of either version in order to use it on 
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appeal.22 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-6 provides: 
A transcript of a reporter's notes, written in 
longhand or typewritten, certified by him as 
being a correct transcript of evidence and 
proceedings, is a prima facie correct statement 
of such evidence and proceedings. 
The implication of this statute, when read together with 
the rest of the Act, is that a transcript which is prepared by 
someone who is not certified is not prima facie correct, and that a 
party seeking to use such a transcript must, at the very least, 
establish its accuracy. 
In addition to the implications of § 78-56-6 and 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Utah case law, 
although not directly on point, supports Mr. Menzies7 argument that 
the State must establish the accuracy of this uncertified transcript 
in order to use it to review this case. 
In Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d 136 (Utah 1975), a 
civil divorce case, an apparently certified reporter had forgotten 
to sign the certification of the transcript. In this relatively 
simple case, the court was able to look to the minute entry which 
agreed in substance with the transcript and thereby flsupplie[d] the 
proof of the accuracy of the transcript." Id. at 138. This 
language in Flannery supports Mr. Menzies7 position that the 
presumption of correctness does not apply, and the party seeking to 
2 2
 The State presented very little evidence in the new 
trial hearings, relying instead on Judge Uno7s erroneous ruling that 
Mr. Menzies must establish the inaccuracy of the transcript. See 
R. 1166, 1185, 1931. 
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use the transcript must "supply the proof" of its accuracy.23 
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983), also 
supports Mr. Menzies' argument that the State must establish the 
accuracy of the transcript. In Taylor, this Court stated that it 
was "not at liberty to assume" what missing voir dire answers were. 
Even though the trial court had left the juror on the panel and the 
lower court had affirmed the decision in denying defendant's motion 
for new trial, this Court reversed the conviction and granted 
defendant a new trial. 
The trial court's conclusion that Mr. Menzies had the 
burden of establishing the inaccuracy of the transcript was 
incorrect. 
B. NEITHER THE "ORIGINAL" VERSION NOR THE 
"CALIFORNIA" VERSION IS AN ACCURATE, RELIABLE, 
VERBATIM REFLECTION OF WHAT OCCURRED IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Although Mr. Menzies continues to maintain that the State 
has the burden, the evidence of inaccuracy of either version of the 
transcript is so overwhelming that the transcript is not useable, 
regardless of who has the burden. 
1. Ms. Lee Did Not Record All of the 
Proceedings. 
Ms. Lee stopped recording voir dire questions, and 
23
 Because of the numerosity and complexity of the 
issues in this case, the length of the trial, and the need for a 
mandatory review for plain error, resorting to minute entries does 
not resolve the transcript problems in this case. Furthermore, the 
minute entries in this case are themselves unreliable. Counsel for 
Mr. Menzies has been unable to locate a minute entry for at least 
one hearing—the hearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress which was 
held on November 7, 1986. 
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instead, the notereader inserted questions that had been asked of 
previous jurors. R. 1931:30-33, 35; T. 51-2. Ms. Lee's failure to 
record all of the questions was discovered because the trial judge 
had misstated one of the questions asked of an initial juror, and 
that misstatement is repeated throughout the voir dire. R. 1931:33; 
see 338, 371, 379, 404, 425, 452, 498, 508, 529, 541, 562, 572, 602, 
634, 645, 657, 677, 689, 701, 721, 731, 734, 739, 747, 760, 770, 
781, 809, 820, 836, 846, 866, 882. This apparently happened for 
more than one question. T. 618; R. 1931:37. 
In addition, questions and juror responses do not make 
sense, suggesting that Ms. Lee did not take down the questions as 
asked, instead inserting them from earlier questions. T. 55, 103, 
117, 128, 215, 530, 543, 711, 753, 859-86. 
Furthermore, Ms. Lee did not take down admonitions to the 
jury during voir dire. Instead, she placed an asterisk in her 
notes, and the notereader made up a statement which she attributed 
to the judge. See, e.g., T. 557, 584, 594, 624, 638, 663, 681, 694, 
725, 741, 751, 765, 766, 774, 787, 815, 831, 853. Ms. Lee also 
failed to take down admonitions throughout the trial. R. 1931:31-2. 
2. The Original Version is Not "Sufficiently 
Accurate." 
a. A notereader and proofreader prepared the 
original version. 
A notereader prepared the original version from Ms. Lee's 
shorthand notes. R. 1166:108, 174.24 After the notereader prepared 
24 MS. Lee obtained the name of the notereader from 
another shorthand reporter. R. 1166:174. The notereader was not a 
(continued) 
O A 
the transcript, the notereader gave it to a third person 
("proofreader") who read the transcript for errors. R. 1166:108, 
174.25 
The use of notereaders is not favored by qualified 
shorthand reporters because "[t]here is too much room for 
misinterpretation." R. 1185:11, 12, 36, 43. A reporter would have 
to take "extremely accurate notes that somebody could read almost 
without a flaw" in order to effectively use a notereader. 
R. 1185:43. The reporter would then have to read each page word for 
word before certifying the transcript. R. 1185:11, 12, 43. Very 
few court reporters use notereaders. R. 1185:4l.26 
(footnote 24 continued) 
certified shorthand reporter, and Ms. Lee did not do a background 
check on her, nor did she check to make sure the notereader could 
read her notes. R. 1166:174. 
2 5
 Ms. Lee did not know who the proofreader was or 
whether she had any qualifications; Ms. Lee did not do a background 
check on the proofreader, nor did she have any direct dealings with 
her. R. 1166:175. Ms. Lee did proofread the first volume. 
R. 1166:177. After that, the notereader decided that it would be 
faster to have someone else proof the remaining volumes, so the 
notereader retained the proofreader and Ms. Lee stopped reading the 
volumes. R. 1166:176. The notereader was working at another job 
while she prepared these transcripts. R. 1166:184. After the 
proofreader read the transcripts, she gave them back to the 
notereader, who in turn, gave them to Ms. Lee. R. 1166:175. The 
notereader marked the transcripts with paperclips where she had 
questions. R. 1166:175. Ms. Lee then read the paperclipped 
portions and gave the transcript back to the notereader for 
corrections. Ms. Lee did not check the transcripts again to make 
sure that the changes had been made. R. 1166:207. Nor did she read 
the entire volume before certifying that the transcript was a true 
and correct reflection of what occurred in court. R. 1166:175, 177, 
205, 208. To date, Ms. Lee has read only the first volume of 
transcript "prepared" by her in this case. 
26 Carlton Way, a Third District Court reporter, uses a 
notereader and gave the name of his notereader to Ms. Lee. 
(continued) 
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A comparison of the transcript prepared by certified 
reporter Carlton Way with that prepared by the notereader27 
indicates that the notereader in the present case took significant 
liberties in transcribing the notes. See Addendum N containing 
T. 888-93 and the official transcript certified by Carlton Way and 
prepared from the same notes as T. 888-93.28 
(footnote 26 continued) 
R. 1185:84. He used the notereader "sparingly" for approximately a 
thousand pages per year. R. 1185:85, 89. He gave her overflow work 
only; the only felony jury trial he had her prepare was a transcript 
for a case in Idaho where the transcript was to be used on retrial 
after a hung jury. R. 1185:91. He never had the notereader prepare 
a felony jury trial transcript which was to be used for appellate 
purposes; the only appeal transcript she prepared for him was from a 
civil bench trial. R. 1185:90, 91. Mr. Way testified that he read 
the entire transcript which was prepared by the notereader and that 
it was his responsibility to make sure that it was accurate before 
certifying it. R. 1185:93-4. 
Although Mr. Way testified that the notereader's work was 
generally "excellent," he had used her only for a total of 
approximately two thousand pages over the course of two to three 
years. Both the trial court and this Court are able to compare a 
short section of her work against an official transcript prepared by 
a certified court reporter, and determine whether the notereader7s 
work in fact appears to be excellent. T. 888-93. See Addendum N. 
2 7
 In the present case, the notereader accidentally 
prepared a short section of notes which had been taken by Mr. Way 
when Ms. Lee failed to attend a portion of a hearing. T. 888. 
Apparently, the notes were erroneously given to the notereader along 
with Ms. Lee's notes, and the notereader included them in the 
original version. Ms. Lee certified the transcript prepared from 
these notes in the original version even though she had not been 
present when they were taken. T. 888-94. 
2 8
 In five and one-half pages of transcript, there were 
27 discrepancies in words, phrases or names of speakers between the 
notereader7s version of what was in the notes and that which was 
transcribed by Mr. Way. The notereader indicated that different 
people were speaking than Mr. Way, confusing Ernie Jones for Rick 
MacDougal, defense counsel for the prosecutor, and defense counsel 
for the judge, among others; at one point, the notereader indicated 
only one speaker where Ms. Wells actually interrupted Ms. Palacios, 
according to Mr. Way. T. 889-91. The notereader also selected 
(continued) 
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The notereader was not present during the trial and 
relied completely on Ms. Lee's notes in preparing the transcript. 
Hence, the unreliability of Ms. Lee's notes further demonstrates the 
unreliability of the original version. Portions of the original 
version which make more sense than the California version do so only 
because the notereader guessed as to what may have been said. 
The manner in which the original version was prepared 
demonstrates the unreliability of that transcript, and that is not 
"sufficiently accurate" for review of this case. 
b. The original version contains voir dire 
answers, argument, testimony, and statements by 
the court which the notereader made up. 
Portions of the original transcript do not appear in 
Ms. Lee's notes. The notereader apparently created portions of the 
transcript. 
(1) Voir dire answers, questions, admonitions, or 
discussions which were apparently made up by the notereader can be 
(footnote 28 continued) 
words other than those which were in the notes. For example, she 
selected "a substitute" instead of the word "astute" and "raise your 
hand" instead of record. T. 888, 891. She also left out words, 
such as "able," "any," and "between 9:00 and." T. 888, 892, 890. 
In addition, she included phrases which were different from those 
transcribed by Mr. Way, such as "Or can we start" instead of "We can 
start," defense counsel saying "as well as that—the jurors you have 
selected" instead of the court saying "Is that the jurors as you 
have selected them?," and "has created problems with us exercising 
to have a fair and impartial jury" instead of "has created problems 
with us being—exercising and having a fair and impartial jury." 
T. 890, 892. Finally, she inserted activity which was not in the 
notes and left out words which were included in the notes. T. 890, 
891. Although an official version prepared by certified court 
reporter Carlton Way exists in regard to these five and one-half 
pages, the discrepancies in the notereader7s version are 
nevertheless significant in that they demonstrate the unreliable 
manner in which the original version was prepared. 
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found at the following transcript pages: 52, 130, 461, 557, 594, 
624, 638, 663, 681, 688, 694, 709, 734, 740, 751, 766, 774, 787, 
815, 876; R. 1932:30-1. 
The original version shows the trial judge asking a 
rehabilitating question of a juror, whereas Ms. Lee's notes do not 
include such question and, in fact, include a question that makes no 
sense but is significantly different from the notereader's version. 
T. 687-8. The original version left out answers and questions and 
attributed statements, answers and questions (T. 588, 699, 740, 821, 
858), to various speakers which did not appear in Ms. Lee's notes. 
T. 707, 740, 804. Questions and juror responses do not make sense. 
T. 55, 103, 117, 128, 215, 530, 543, 711, 753, 859-86. 
(2) Ms. Lee supplied the notereader with copies of 
police reports, the trial judge's notes, and the autopsy reports 
which she had possession of unbeknownst to the defense. 
R. 1931:73-75. When the shorthand notes were opened for review by 
Ms. Lee in California, the police reports were still wrapped around 
the notes. R. 1931:74. The notereader supplemented Ms. Lee's notes 
with information from those reports or notes. See, e.g., 2238, 
2266, 3261; R. 1931:73. 
(3) Other examples of portions of the transcript which 
the notereader made up can be found at the following pages: 52, 
130, 234, 251, 461, 557, 584, 594, 624, 638, 663, 681, 688, 694, 
706, 709, 734, 740, 751, 766, 774, 787, 815, 876, 1605, 1606, 1611, 
1614, 1628, 1643, 1653, 1674, 1731, 1741, 1775, 1810, 1845, 1849, 
1854, 1857, 2196, 2201, 2207, 2299, 2307, 2399, 3035, 3055. 
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3. Ms. Lee's Notes and the "California" 
Version Are Unreliable. 
The State agreed that the notereader7s creations often 
made more sense than Ms. Lee's notes, even though the notereader was 
not present during the proceedings. R. 1932:27, 30, 45, 46, 47, 55, 
58, 66. 
A review of the California version establishes that 
significant portions are unintelligible; that Ms. Lee had difficulty 
accurately recording numbers, names, words, and phrases; and that 
Ms. Lee failed to take verbatim notes. R. 1931:28-9, 31-2. See 
discussion infra at 32-36. 
4. Ms. Lee Was Not Qualified to Report This 
Case. 
The State argued that Ms. Lee would have automatically 
been licensed had she applied in Utah, and Judge Uno determined that 
Ms. Lee was "de facto" licensed and qualified to report this trial 
(R. 1186:5; R. 1725). Even if Ms. Lee were qualified and would have 
been licensed, she did not obtain a license and the presumption of 
§ 78-56-6 is not therefore applicable. The issue of whether she 
would have been licensed is relevant only to the issue of whether 
Ms. Lee had the background and experience necessary to act as a 
court reporter in this case, and not to the issue of whether the 
transcripts are certified. 
A review of the Act demonstrates that Ms. Lee would not 
have been automatically licensed had she applied in Utah. Her 
California license was delinquent, and she therefore could not 
demonstrate good standing in California or use that license as a 
basis for obtaining a Utah license without taking the Utah 
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examination. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16. Relying on her nontested 
RPR designation, which she obtained based on her delinquent 
California license, to obtain a Utah license would have violated 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16.29 
Furthermore, in order to be licensed as a court reporter, 
a person must be of good moral character. The State of Utah never 
took the opportunity to investigate the moral character of Ms. Lee 
prior to hiring her. Evidence exists in this case demonstrating 
that Ms. Lee does not have the character for honesty required of 
court reporters. Her testimony during the hearings contains 
numerous false statements. R. 1166:169-70; R. 1185:20-1. According 
to Ron Gibson, Ms. Lee claimed that she needed to work at home on 
the Menzies transcripts to utilize her computer (see Addendum K; 
R. 1166:77); Ms. Lee later denied under oath that she had used her 
computer on the Menzies transcripts or made such a statement to Ron 
Gibson. R. 1166:178. She breached the security of the district 
court. R. 1166:79; see Addenda K and L. She had sanctions imposed 
against her in California for failure to file timely transcripts. 
See Addendum G.30 
2 9
 Although the State claimed that court reporters were 
licensed based on a nontested RPR designation at the time Ms. Lee 
was hired, the statute specifically requires an examination and good 
standing. U.C.A. § 78-56-16. No rules deviating from the statutory 
examination requirement existed at that time. If the court 
reporters were being licensed based on a nontested RPR designation, 
such licensure violated Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16. A nontested RPR 
designation cannot now be used as a basis for obtaining a Utah 
license. 
3 0
 Allegations of fraud and official misconduct were 
included in the Accusation filed in California prior to revocation 
of Ms. Lee's California license. See Addendum I. 
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In addition, Ms. Lee knew very little about the role of 
the court reporter. She claimed that did not know that she had to 
be licensed to act as an official reporter in Utah. R. 1166:114. 
She included an ex parte statement from the prosecutor after the 
trial was over, then testified that anything having to do with 
Mr. Menzies was legitimately part of the record in this case and 
that she, not Judge Uno, was the person responsible for deciding 
what to include. T. 3273-6; R. 1166:160-1. She certified 
transcripts using an expired and delinquent license number when she 
had not read the transcripts and therefore was not in a position to 
so certify. R. 1166:123-4, 205. She stopped taking notes during 
portions of voir dire and simply repeated questions the judge had 
asked of an earlier juror, even though the judge did not instruct 
her to stop taking notes. R. 1931:31-2. She failed or refused to 
attend hearings when Judge Uno's court was in session. See Addenda 
K and L. 
Furthermore, the quality of Ms. Lee's work was bad. 
R. 1185:15-17, 45-9. She was fired or let go from the two court 
reporting firms where she attempted to work immediately prior to and 
after she reported this trial. R. 1185:18, 48. She had difficulty 
taking accurate notes and then reading those notes once she had 
taken them. R. 1185:17. She omitted words, the transcripts she 
prepared contained "total inconsistent errors throughout," and 
customers complained about her work. R. 1185:16-17, 47. Both 
reporters testified that she was not capable of reporting a capital 
homicide case. R. 1185:15-17, 20-1, 46-50, 53. 
Ms. Lee testified that she had worked as a court reporter 
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for "the whole time" since she had been licensed in California in 
April, 1985 and that "over the last four and a half, almost five 
years, everything I've done in court has been some type of a jury." 
R. 1166:102. Her own testimony as well as other evidence introduced 
at the hearings established that this testimony was not true.31 
The overwhelming evidence as to Ms. Lee's lack of ability 
to transcribe this case supports Mr. Menzies' argument that the 
transcripts in this case are wholly unreliable. 
5. Apparent Errors Demonstrate That Neither 
Version is Sufficiently Accurate. 
3 1
 Ms. Lee's later testimony and that of Linda 
Van Tassell established that Ms. Lee had not worked as a court 
reporter "the whole time" since she had been licensed and had, in 
fact, worked as a secretary for a short period of time (R. 1166:106) 
and had been unemployed for significant periods of time, including 
the period from April, 1987 when her California license became 
delinquent until July, 1987 when she got a part-time temporary job 
as a secretary at BYU for two weeks (R. 1166:106, 122, 128) and from 
approximately October 15, 1987 until she obtained the position in 
Third District Court on January 14, 1988 (R. 1185:15; see also 
resume of Tauni Lee contained in personnel file, D.E. 4). Nor was 
almost everything Ms. Lee did a jury trial. Most of her experience 
was in California municipal court, which is similar to Utah's 
circuit court in that it hears traffic matters, small civil cases, 
and misdemeanors. R. 1166:102, 119. During her less than two years 
as a court reporter in California, she reported only eight cases in 
which appellate transcripts were requested. At least four of those 
were civil cases in which Orders to Show Cause for failure to file 
the transcript in a timely fashion were eventually filed against 
her. See Addenda G and H. In at least one of those cases, the 
transcript was "sent out for corrections." In addition, Ms. Lee was 
at some point jailed for her failure to follow a court order that 
she prepare transcripts. R. 1189 (September 24, 1990):12. 
Ms. Lee also testified that as part of the California 
examination, she had been tested for five minutes at 2 00 words per 
minute and had been told that she obtained a 97 percent accuracy 
score. R. 1166:99. Even if Ms. Lee's testimony were to be 
believed, she had taken the test almost three years before she was 
hired by Third District Court and had been unlicensed for nine 
months at the time she was hired. 
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a. Portions of the transcript are 
unintelligible. 
(1) Numerous portions relating to the "Britton" issue 
are unintelligible. T. 961, 962, 963, 964, 966, 967, 1077, 1088, 
1090, 1091, 1092, 1107, 1110, 1114, 1115, 1117, 1121, 1122, 1124, 
1822, 1828, 1829, 1849, 1851, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1857, 1859, 1860, 
1867, 1868, 1869, 2007, 2011, 2019, 2027, 2029, 2031, 2039, 2053, 
2054, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2068-9. The erroneous admission of 
Britton7s preliminary hearing testimony is an appellate issue in 
this case. 
(2) Defense counsel argued that Mr. Menzies' entire 
prison record should not be admitted during the penalty phase. 
R. 2839-40, 42-4. Portions of that argument and the bases for the 
trial court admitting the record are unintelligible. R. 2839-44, 
2885-87. The erroneous admission of this record spawned several 
appellate issues. 
(3) Mr. Menzies challenged several jurors for cause. 
Ms. Lee's version of the questions and answers of those jurors does 
not reflect what was stated or are unintelligible. T. 272-80, 289, 
357, 350-60, 543, 545, 548-9, 741, 747. She confused speakers. 
T. 284-5, 741, 757, 760. In argument, counsel refers to questions 
and answers which are not in the transcript. T. 358-60. The 
notereader made up voir dire answers for some of the jurors. 
T. 751-2. Issues regarding Mr. Menzies7 challenges for cause are 
being raised on appeal. The importance of reviewing voir dire and 
the granting or denial of challenges for cause in capital cases is 
well established and often requires reversal. 
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(4) Other unintelligible portions of the transcript 
occur at 914, 988, 1469 (defense objection omitted), 1857, 1615, 
1626, 1790, 2066, 2068 (court ruling); 2019, 1942 (ruling on 
mistrial motion and factual findings); 1952, 2001, 2005, 2010, 2011, 
2013-4, 2137, 2139, 2166, 2175, 2176, 2179, 2183, 2239, 2240, 2243, 
2246, 2363, 2364, 2372, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2394, 2398, 2402, 2405, 
2422-3, 2439. 
b. The State agreed and the trial court found 
that portions of the transcript were 
unintelligible. 
The State stipulated and the Court found that portions of 
the 29 pages of transcript reviewed during the "reconstruction 
hearing" on December 19, 1990 were incomprehensible or inaccurately 
taken down, and that the version created by the notereader often 
made more sense than that which had been taken down by Ms. Lee, even 
though the notereader worked exclusively from Ms. Lee's notes. 
R. 1932:27, 30, 45-46, 47, 55, 58, 62, 66. 
c. Ms. Lee was unable to read her notes. 
During the proceedings in California, Ms. Lee indicated 
on numerous occasions that she could not read her notes; a review of 
the context also demonstrates her inability to read her notes. 
Examples of portions of proceedings where Ms. Lee was 
unable to read her notes can be found on the following transcript 
pages: 7, 14, 50, 74, 1611, 1612, 1668, 1783, 1829, 1870, 1939, 
2497, 2624, 2637, 2653, 2654, 2970, 2972, 2982, 2985, 3003, 3058, 
3079, 3085, 3172, 3173, 3178. 
d. Numbers contained in either version of the 
transcript are wholly unreliable. 
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A comparison of the "original" transcripts with Ms. Lee's 
"California" version demonstrates that Ms. Lee was incapable of 
accurately taking down numbers, and raises the concern that any 
number throughout the transcripts, even where the notereader and 
Ms. Lee read the same number, is wholly unreliable due to Ms. Lee's 
deficiencies in taking down numbers. 
Mr. Menzies has identified number discrepancies in the 
following pages: T. 8, 14, 15, 30, 32, 34, 36, 41, 271, 385, 887, 
1478, 1507, 1513, 1514, 1515, 1604, 1612, 1678, 1703, 1734, 1742, 
1745, 1786, 1875, 1877, 1881, 1888, 1889, 1920, 1927, 2006, 2007, 
2028, 2039, 2053, 2055, 2251, 3656, 2651, 2264, 2318, 2620, 2652, 
2665, 2704, 2860, 2923, 2960, 3035, 3094, 3202, 3237, 3257, 3259. 
e. Ms. Lee did not accurately hear and take 
down what was said in court.32 
Ms. Lee had repeated difficulty with names. T. 18, 41, 
51, 53, 55, 68, 114, 117, 159, 189, 192, 201, 207, 284-5, 741. In 
addition, throughout the transcript, errors can be found which 
indicate that Ms. Lee misheard and/or incorrectly noted what was 
said. T. 150 ("Bankridge" instead of "Panguitch"); 1628, 1710, 
1823, 1845, 2040 ("cave" instead of "archive"); 1659, 1665, 1707, 
1713, 2001 ("functional" instead of "fungible"); 2972 ("sure now" 
instead of "thorough"); 3055 ("usual" instead of "unusual"); 3061 
("four shock block test" instead of "Rorschach test"); 323 0 
("appropriate" instead of "inappropriate"). 
3 2
 During the new trial proceedings on at least one 
occasion, the prosecutor acknowledged that a miscommunication had 
occurred between what was said in court and Ms. Lee's ear. 
R. 1188:53-4. 
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f. The transcript indicates an incorrect 
speaker. 
In portions of the transcript, it is difficult to 
ascertain who, in fact, is speaking. T. 1243, 1622, 1775, 1853, 
1859, 2031, 2032, 2076, 2509, 2584. 
g. Ms. Lee failed to take down what occurred 
in court. 
Ms. Lee used asterisks in her notes to denote a number of 
things including bench conferences, swearing in, taking an oath, 
admitting an exhibit, admonitions by the judge, etc. R. 1931:3 0-3. 
Not all occurrences are reflected in the transcript. See, e.g., 
281, 289, 1613, 1633, 1634, 1637, 1673, 1676, 1678, 1679, 1680, 
1681, 1716, 1717, 1730, 1774, 1775, 1809, 1816, 1869, 1878, 1880, 
2365, 2402, 2407, 2430, 2450, 2452, 2607. 
h. Items appear to be missing from portions of 
the transcript. 
In many places, topics of discussion change abruptly, 
answers do not follow from the questions before them, or the 
transcript does not make sense. The most glaring example of this 
occurred when the juror fainted. T. 1622.33 
C. THE LACK OF A VERBATIM ACCURATE TRANSCRIPT 
WITH WHICH TO REVIEW THIS CASE VIOLATES UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-3-206, REQUIRING REVERSAL ABSENT 
A SHOWING OF HARM. 
3 3
 Although the participants remember the bailiff 
running across the room and possibly saying something along with 
several other events, the transcript reflects only that the judge 
took a recess. T. 1622. Nothing further is on the record until 
much later when other events involving the jurors occur. However, a 
nonsequitur appears several pages later when the judge says, "Rick 
may be much more subtle or sophisticated." T. 1624. 
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As previously outlined, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) 
requires that the trial court certify the "entire record" to this 
Court so that this court can conduct its mandatory review. Implicit 
in § 76-3-206(2) is a requirement that an accurate, complete, 
verbatim transcript of proceedings be included in the record. See 
Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d at 213, 214 n. 5 (defendant in capital 
case entitled to "verbatim transcription"; court cannot begin review 
until trial court certifies "entire record"). 
The Dunn court emphasized that a capital defendant need 
not show harm in order to obtain a new trial where the "entire 
record" is not certified to the appellate court. The court stated: 
Moreover, because this is a death penalty case, 
"[wje may not shirk our duty to review 'the 
entire record7 [citation omitted] on the 
grounds that the appellant has not shown 'harm7 
in being denied portions of a transcription of 
notes taken by the court reporter during the 
course of the trial of a capital case. That 
this Court have before it the entire record in 
a capital case serves a public policy which 
considers assuring even handed imposition of 
the ultimate penalty as important, if not more 
so, than faulting the one condemned for 
inability to demonstrate on appeal how an error 
resulted in disadvantage." McGee v. State, 711 
S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. Cr. App. 1986) 
(Clinton, J., concurring). 
Dunn, 733 S.W.2d at 216. See also Little v. State, 97 S.W.2d 479, 
480 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936). 
Other courts require a complete and accurate transcript 
of proceedings in the trial court in order to effectuate a mandatory 
review of a death sentence. See Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 
(Okl. Cr. 1988); Kelly v. State, 692 P.2d 563, 565 (Okl. Cr. 1984) 
(Brett, J., concurring); Delap v. State, 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977). 
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Where such a complete and accurate transcript does not exist, 
reversal is required regardless of whether the defendant can show 
harm. 
Although these cases, for the most part, deal with 
situations where a transcript of a portion of proceedings is 
missing, the rationale that no showing of harm is necessary is 
nevertheless applicable where an inaccurate and uncertified 
transcript is all that is available for the mandatory review of a 
capital homicide conviction and death sentence. The significant 
inaccuracies in this transcript are analogous to missing portions; 
furthermore, portions of the record are missing in this case since 
Ms. Lee failed to take notes during portions of voir dire and failed 
to record other portions of the proceedings. See discussion supra 
at 23-4; 27-9. 
The lack of a verbatim, accurate and complete transcript 
of proceedings in this case makes mandatory review under Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-206(2) and requires reversal absent a showing of 
specific harm as it relates to issues being raised on appeal. 
POINT III. IN ADDITION TO THE INABILITY TO 
REVIEW THIS TRANSCRIPT FOR PLAIN ERROR. 
MR. MENZIES WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE FROM THE USE 
OF EITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court requires a showing of 
specific harm from the use of either version of this transcript, 
Mr. Menzies outlines the following areas of prejudice: 
1. Voir Dire: Ms. Lee failed to take down all 
questions; the notereader created questions and answers. See 
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discussion supra at 27-9. See State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d at 447. 
2. Numbers: The unreliability of any number in this 
transcript prejudices Mr. Menzies in the following ways: 
a. What rule of evidence were the parties 
arguing? T. 15. In the reconstruction hearing, the 
parties agreed and Judge Uno found that Rule "45" was an 
incorrect transcription. R. 1932:47-53. Nevertheless, 
Judge Uno ordered that Rule 45 remain in the transcript 
because after reviewing the Rules of Evidence and 
rereading the transcript, the parties could not figure 
out which rule was being argued. R. 1932:47-53. The 
argument found at T. 15 relates directly to the "Britton" 
issue on appeal; as the transcript now stands, it is 
impossible to tell what was being argued. 
b. When did Nicole Arnold and her new husband 
deliver the Social Security card? An appellate issue in 
this case is Mr. Menzies7 argument that the trial judge 
erroneously admitted a Social Security card bearing the 
name of Maureen Hunsaker. Defense counsel attempted to 
preclude the admission of the card by highlighting a 
discrepancy in dates. T. 1514, 2263-5. The "California" 
and "original" versions transpose the dates, and there is 
no way to ascertain the actual date to which Janet Franks 
testified. T. 1514-5. 
c. Dates relating to Britton's federal 
sentencing and Rule 35 motion are unclear from the 
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transcript and relate directly to his motive for 
testifying at the preliminary hearing. T. 2011, 2038, 
2039, 
d. When did Officer Valdez find Maureen 
Hunsaker's identification cards in the jail? Was it 
before Mr. Menzies was booked? The two versions offer 
different dates which are four days apart; the 
discrepancy impacts on whether the cards can be linked to 
Mr. Menzies. T. 1604, 1600-4. This example is also 
significant in that it demonstrates the liberties taken 
by the notereader in attempting to "fix" the transcript. 
R. 1931:38. 
e. How far was Tim Larabee from the two people 
he viewed at Storm Mountain? T. 1198. On what date did 
Detective Judd prepare the composite? T. 1703. In both 
instances, the notereader's version differs significantly 
from that of Ms. Lee; both impact on Tilths ability to 
identify the male he saw at Storm Mountain. 
f. What day did Officer Thompson talk to Ralph 
Menzies? T. 1875. Where did Ralph tell Officer Thompson 
he picked up the young woman hitchhiker? T. 1876, 1881. 
Where did they get stuck in the mud? T. 1877. What was 
the stipulation between the parties as to when the 
booking process ended? T. 1888, 1889 (a shorter booking 
process would demonstrate that Mr. Menzies did not have 
time to secrete the identification cards later found in 
jail laundry). How much money was missing from the 
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Gas-A-Mat, and how much was found in the umbrella? 
T. 2620. 
In the penalty phase, was Dr. Winkleman's 
testimony based on study of 100 clients or 1 client? 
T. 2960. In what I.Q. percentile does Mr. Menzies 
function—5th, 55th 80th, or 85th? T. 3035, 3036. 
3. Numerous Portions of the Arguments Regarding the 
Admission of Britton's Preliminary Hearing Testimony Are 
Unintelligible. T. 961, 962, 963, 964, 966, 967, 1077, 1088, 1090, 
1091, 1092, 1107, 1110, 1114, 1115, 1117, 1121, 1122, 1124, 1822, 
1828, 1829, 1849, 1851, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1857, 1859, 1860, 1867, 
1868, 1869, 2007, 2011, 2019, 2027, 2029, 2031, 2039, 2053, 2054, 
2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2068-9. 
4. Ms. Lee's Inability to Read Her Notes Prejudiced 
Mr. Menzies. 
What were voir dire answers? E.g., T. 50, 52, 151-2. 
Did the question asked by Judge Uno rehabilitate the juror? T. 74. 
What did the witness answer? T. 1668, 2970, 2972. What was it 
Mr. Menzies did not have in the last two years? T. 3003.34 What 
was the second diagnosis of Mr. Menzies that neither the notereader 
nor Ms. Lee could read? T. 3079. Is it important to mitigation? 
Would it affect a reviewing court's impression of the penalty phase 
evidence? Is important mitigation evidence not included in an 
accurate manner? T. 3085, 3172, 3173, 3178. 
3 4
 The lack of a dismissal is not mitigation; however, 
the lack of a "disciplinary" would be mitigating evidence. T. 3003. 
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5. Witnesses May Not Have Been Sworn. T. 926, 
R. 802-3. The names of the three witnesses which Ms. Lee indicated 
were sworn when the exclusionary rule was invoked are not included 
in the transcript. T. 926; see also R. 802-3. Ms. Lee did not 
record the swearing of witnesses; instead, she inserted asterisks. 
Additional prejudice relating to issues on appeal exists; 
due to page limitations, Mr. Menzies outlines only those errors set 
forth above. 
POINT IV. THE LACK OF A VERBATIM ACCURATE 
TRANSCRIPT VIOLATES THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution, 
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment, protects 
against cruel and unusual punishment. In order to comply with the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments, the death penalty cannot be 
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner, and a capital 
sentencing scheme must genuinely narrow the class of persons upon 
whom the death penalty can be imposed and provide a meaningful basis 
for distinguishing the few cases in which the penalty is imposed. 
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 310, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2763, 33 
L.Ed.2d 46 (1972); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 
2958, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 
1972), cert, denied 459 U.S. 988 (1982); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 
U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398, 406 (1980). 
Decisions of this Court indicate that meaningful 
appellate review is a necessary component of Utah's death penalty 
scheme to insure that the penalty is imposed so as not to violate 
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the eighth and fourteenth amendments. In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 
546, 552-3 (Utah 1987), this Court reiterated "the established rule 
[for mandatory review] in death penalty cases" and emphasized that 
the rule, as outlined, "best supports the past practices of this 
Court, as well as our continuing responsibility to insure that the 
sentence of death meets the concerns of Furman v. Georgia." Id. at 
553. See also State v. Holland, 777 P.2d at 1022 ("[e]xecution of a 
criminal defendant may not occur . . . until this Court determines 
at least that the sentence is in accord with lawful process"). 
In Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d at 214, n.5, the court 
pointed out that "mandatory review of the entire record in a capital 
case" is not a mere formality. Rather, it is an essential component 
of the procedure chosen by the legislature "to ensure that ,this 
unique penalty [is not] wantonly and . . . freakishly imposed' 
[citation omitted]." 
Various United States Supreme Court opinions also suggest 
that meaningful appellate review of a death sentence is essential to 
meet the requirements of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. In 
his concurrence in Pulley v. Harris. 465 U.S. 37, 54, 104 S.Ct. 871, 
79 L.Ed.2d 29, 43 (1984), Justice Stevens emphasized the importance 
of meaningful appellate review. 
. . . I believe that appellate review plays an 
essential role in eliminating the systematic 
arbitrariness and capriciousness which infected 
death penalty schemes invalidated by Furman v. 
Georgia [citation omitted], and hence that some 
form of meaningful appellate review is 
constitutionally required. 
See also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) ("As an important additional safeguard against 
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arbitrariness and caprice, the Georgia statutory scheme provides for 
automatic appeal of all death sentences to the State Supreme 
Court.11); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 
L.Ed.2d 235, 248 (1983) ("Georgia's scheme includes two important 
features . . . a bifurcated procedure [citation omitted] and its 
statute also mandates meaningful appellate review of every death 
sentence [citation omitted]"); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. at 276 ("By 
providing prompt judicial review of the jury's decision in a court 
of statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the 
evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences 
under law."); Parker v. Dugger, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 731, 
L.Ed.2d (January 22, 1991) (capital homicide case remanded 
based on arbitrary affirmance of death sentence). 
Without a complete and accurate transcript, meaningful 
appellate review is impossible. See State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d 748 
(Wis. 1987). As Justice Goldberg stated in his concurring opinion 
in Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 227, 84 S.Ct. 2124, 11 L.Ed.2d 
331 (1964): 
[T]he most basic and fundamental tool [of an 
appellate attorney's] profession is the 
complete trial transcript, through which his 
fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam 
in search of an error, a lead to an error, or 
even a basis upon which to urge a change in an 
established and hitherto accepted principle of 
law. 
375 U.S. at 288, 84 S.Ct. at 431. 
Because meaningful appellate review is an "essential 
component" of Utah's death penalty scheme, the eighth and fourteenth 
amendments would be violated by the use of the transcripts in this 
case for mandatory review. 
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POINT V. LACK OF AN ACCURATE VERBATIM 
TRANSCRIPT VIOLATES MR, MENZIES' RIGHT TO 
APPEAL UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution explicitly 
guarantees, inter alia, that a criminal defendant has the "right to 
appeal in all cases." See also Article VIII, §5. In State v. 
Tuttle, 713 P.2d 703 (Utah 1985), this Court recognized that this 
provision demonstrates that "the drafters of our constitution 
considered the right to appeal essential to a fair criminal 
proceeding." Id. at 740. This Court emphasized that "[r]ights 
guaranteed by our state constitution are to be carefully protected" 
and will not be "lightly forfeited,"35 and focused on "the 
fundamental nature of the right to appellate review" under the state 
constitution. Id.36 
A number of older decisions from various states have held 
that the defendant's right to appeal has been violated, requiring 
3 5
 The federal constitution does not explicitly provide 
for a right to appeal criminal convictions; instead, the right to 
appeal is part of a defendant's federal due process rights where 
state statutory or constitutional law provides. 
3 6
 Various statutes facilitate this fundamental right to 
appellate review. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982) (codifying 
right to appeal); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (Supp. 1989) (providing 
court appointed counsel to indigent defendants through "the taking 
of the first appeal"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (Supp. 1989) 
(requiring prosecuting agency to pay costs of preparing transcripts 
on appeal for indigent defendants); Court Reporters and 
Stenographers Act, § 78-56-1.1 et seq. (1987). 
Although in noncapital contexts, this Court has held that 
failure to transcribe the closing arguments of a criminal trial does 
not require a new trial (State v. Glenny. 656 P.2d 990 (Utah 1982); 
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979)), it has also held that 
inaudible responses during the voir dire of the jury panel required 
a new trial. State v. Taylor. 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983). The impact 
of Article I, § 12 was not explicitly discussed in any of these 
cases. 
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reversal of the conviction, where the court reporter has not 
prepared an adequate transcript. See, e.g., Little v. State, 97 
S.W.2d 479 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Brannan v. State, 132 S.W.2d 594 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1939); Seliaer v. State, 138 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1940); People v. Lomoso, 134 N.Y.S.2d 129 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1954); Gibbs v. State, 214 P. 745 (Okl. Crim. App. 1928); People v. 
DeWilkowska, 285 N.Y.S. 430 (App. Div. 1936). Although most of 
these cases are not clear as to whether the decision is based on 
state statutory or constitutional grounds, or federal grounds, they 
affirm the principle that where a criminal defendant, through no 
fault of his own, is denied an adequate transcript of the 
proceedings, the conviction must be reversed due to the inability of 
the appellate court to review the proceedings. 
In addition, state courts have reversed criminal 
convictions based on a state constitutional analysis where portions 
of a transcript are missing. See State v. Ford, 338 So.2d 107 (La. 
1976); State v. Jones, 351 So.2d 1194 (La. 1977). 
Other provisions in the Utah Constitution, when read in 
conjunction with Article I, § 12, suggest that the Utah Constitution 
requires that an accurate, verbatim transcript of proceedings be 
certified to this Court for appellate review in death penalty cases. 
Article I, § 10 of the Utah Constitution provides that a 
right to a jury in a capital case remains inviolate. Without an 
accurate transcription of proceedings, the appellate court cannot 
ascertain whether that right was violated. 
Furthermore, Article I, § 9 protects against cruel and 
unusual punishment. This Court has acknowledged that the broader 
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language of Article I, § 9 than the eighth amendment could provide 
greater protection to criminal defendants in Utah. See State v. 
Bishop. 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986). 
Without a transcript which accurately reflects what 
occurred in court, Mr. Menzies' right to appeal and the protections 
of Article I, sections 9 and 10 are violated. 
POINT VI. MR. MENZIES/ RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS 
AND EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION WOULD BE VIOLATED IF EITHER 
VERSION OF THIS TRANSCRIPT WERE USED. 
This Court has held that the state due process guarantee 
contained in Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides 
greater protection than the federal due process clause in the 
context of suggestive identification procedures. State v. Ramirez, 
Case No. 880245 (Utah March 21, 1991). In addition, this Court has 
indicated that state due process rights may be implicated where a 
defendant's right to appeal is violated. State v. Tuttle. 713 P.2d 
at 705. The nonexistence of an adequate transcript with which 
appellate counsel can review for error so severely impedes 
Mr. Menzies' ability to pursue an appeal in this case that his state 
due process rights are violated. See generally State v. Smith, 554 
S.W.2d 676 (La. 1989). 
In addition, Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution may 
provide different and greater protection than its federal 
counterpart in the fourteenth amendment. Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 
661, 670 (Utah 1984); State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d at 705; see also 
Article I, § 2 of the Utah Constitution. In a death penalty case, 
where counsel and this Court scrutinize the transcript to ensure 
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that the sentence was not rendered in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner, an inaccurate transcript prepared by an uncertified 
individual violates Mr. Menzies' right to equal protection. 
POINT VII. USE OF EITHER TRANSCRIPT WOULD 
VIOLATE MR. MENZIES' RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS, 
EQUAL PROTECTION AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
Although the right to appeal is not specifically stated 
in the federal constitution, once the right to appeal is established 
by statute or state constitution, it is included in the concept of 
federal due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. See 
Reves v. Delqado, 81 P.R.R. 906, 910 (1960), citing Cole v. 
Arkansas. 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12, 18, 19 (1956); Eskridge v. Washington State Board, 357 U.S. 214, 
215, 216 (1985) (per curiam); Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 
208, 210 (1951). 
In order to adequately pursue an appeal, appellate 
counsel must have a complete and accurate transcript of the 
proceedings. See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 282 
(1964).37 Where appellate counsel is unable to review a complete 
and accurate transcript of proceedings, an appellant's federal due 
process rights are violated. 
In addition, because counsel is unable to effectively 
assist a capital defendant on appeal by reviewing the transcript for 
3 7
 Although Hardy was not decided on constitutional 
grounds, its determination that a complete and accurate transcript 
is necessary for appellate counsel to adequately represent a 
defendant is nevertheless applicable. 
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error or plain error, Mr. Menzies' sixth amendment right to 
effective assistance would be violated by the use of either of these 
transcripts. 
Finally, the use of either transcript would violate 
Mr. Menzies' right to equal protection under the fourteenth 
amendment since other capital defendants are provided with an 
accurate transcript prepared by a certified reporter which can be 
reviewed for plain error. 
POINT VIII. EX PARTE SUPPLEMENTATION OF RECORD 
BY THE STATE VIOLATES UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY RIGHTS AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS. 
In addition to casting additional doubt on the integrity 
and qualification of Ms. Lee, the supplementation of the record by 
the prosecutor without the knowledge, consent or presence of 
Mr. Menzies' defense counsel or the judge violates Mr. Menzies' 
right to appear and defend in person an appeal pursuant to 
Article I, § 12; his right to due process pursuant to Article I, § 7 
and the fourteenth amendment; his right to be free from cruel and 
unusual punishment under Article I, § 9 and the eighth amendment; 
and his right to equal protection pursuant to Article I, § 24 and 
the fourteenth amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial. 
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ART. I, § 10 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In 
courts of general jurisdiction except in capital cases, a jury shall consist 
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of 
four jurors In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil 
cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases 
shall be waived unless demanded. 
ART. I, § 12 
Sec. 12. [Eights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
ART. I, §24 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
ART. I, § 2 CONSTITUTION OP UTAH 
Sec. 2. [All political power inherent in the people.] 
All political power is inherent in the people; and all free governments 
are founded on their authority for their equal protection and benefit, 
and they have the right to alter or reform their government as the public 
welfare may require. 
ART. I, § ^ 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived vt life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
ART. I, § 9 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail &hall not be required, excessive fines shall not be im-
posed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
Rule 11. The record on appeal. 
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice 
to appellee if partial transcript is ordered. 
(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after fil-
ing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request from the reporter a 
transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the 
appellant deems necessary. The request shall be in writing, and, within 
the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and 
the clerk of the appellate court. If no such parts of the proceedings are to 
be requested, within the same period the appellant shall file a certificate 
to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of 
the appellate court. If there was no reporter but the proceedings were 
otherwise recorded, the appellant shall request from a court transcriber, 
certified in accordance with the rules and procedures of the Judicial 
Council, a transcript of such parts of the proceeding not already on file as 
the appellant deems necessary. By stipulation of the parties approved by 
the appellate court, a person other than a certified court transcriber may 
transcribe a recorded hearing. The clerk of the appellate court shall, upon 
request, provide a list of all certified court transcribers. The transcriber is 
subject to all of the obligations imposed on ronnrtor* hv these ru]es 
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on 
appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule, the parties may prepare and 
sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal 
arose and were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the 
facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as are essential to a decision 
of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together 
with such additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present 
the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved by the trial court. The clerk 
of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate 
court within the time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court 
shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the appellate court upon 
approval of the statement by the trial court. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made 
or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceed-
ings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the 
appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the 
best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on 
the appellee, who may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days 
after service. The statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall 
be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and 
approved, shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on 
appeal. 
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as 
to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the 
difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made 
to conform to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from 
the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the 
trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmit-
ted, may direct that the omission or misstatement be corrected and if neces-
sary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The moving 
party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties 
a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days after service, any party 
may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as to the 
form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court. 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed and the 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeal, the case shall be automatically 
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification by the 
sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended by the 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of death has 
priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in disposition by the 
Supreme Court. 
76-3-206. Capital felony — Death or life imprisonment. 
(1) A person who has been convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced 
in accordance with Section 76-3-207, and sentence shall be death or life im-
prisonment as the court or jury, in accordance with this section, shall deter-
mine. 
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to 
automatic review by the Utah State Supreme Court within 60 days after 
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time is ex-
tended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme 
Court for good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme Court 
shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with 
rules promulgated by the Utah State Supreme Court. 
78-56-18. Use of titles or abbreviations by certified short-
hand reporter. 
Any person granted a certificate to practice as a certified shorthand re-
porter shall during its term or any renewal thereof be styled and known as a 
certified shorthand reporter. It is unlawful for any other person to assume 
such title or use the abbreviation C.S.R. or any other similar words, letters, or 
figures to indicate that the person using the same is a certified shorthand 
reporter. 
78-56-19. Crimes. 
Anv violation of the provisions of this act shall be a misdemeanor. 
78-56.11, 78-56-12. Repealed. 
78-56-14. Definition of "shorthand reporter." 
The words "shorthand reporter" as used in this act shall be defined to mean 
any person who is engaged in the practice of making by use of symbols or 
abbreviations a verbatim record of any trial, proceeding, or hearing before 
any district court or circuit court or before any referee, master, board, or 
commission, of this state. 
78-56-15. Appointment of reporters — Eligibility — Certifi-
cate. 
No person may be appointed to the position of shorthand reporter nor act in 
that capacity in any district court or circuit court of this state, or before any 
referee, master, board, or commission of this state unless he has received a 
certificate from the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing as 
provided in this chapter. 
78-56-16. Grant of certificate. 
Any citizen of the United States at least 18 years of age, of good moral 
character, who possesses a high degree of skill and ability in the art of short-
hand reporting, and who passes a satisfactory examination as provided in this 
chapter, is entitled to a certificate and shall be known as a certified shorthand 
reporter. 
78-56-17. Appointment of temporary substitutes. 
If any regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter is disabled from 
performing his duty or is removed from his position, the judge of the court S 
s l s t i t S : h ? ? f i e d S h 0 r t h a n d r e P ° r t e r h 3 S b e e n appointed maf ^ ^ n f a n y 
substitute he deems competent to act during the temporary disability of thp 
regular reporter and until his successor is appointed. T i J Z ^ ^ l 
78-56-8 JUDICIAL CODE 
evidence or proceedings must pay the fees for this to the reporter. If the 
defendant in a criminal case desires to have the reporter transcribe his notes 
taken on the trial, he must pay the reporter's fees for this or deposit an 
equivalent sum with the clerk of the court; but if it appears by affidavit, made 
by the defendant in person, that he is impecunious and unable to pay the 
reporter's fees for transcribing his notes and that a transcript of the same is 
necessary in an appeal on behalf of the defendant, and these facts are not 
successfully controverted, the court may order the reporter to transcribe his 
notes, or so much of them as the court may deem necessary. In criminal cases 
when the proceedings have been transcribed upon the order of the court, the 
fees of the reporter shall be certified by the judge to the state auditor for 
violation of state statute, the county auditor for violation of county ordinance, 
or the city auditor for violation of city code, who shall draw his warrant upon 
the treasurer for the amount so certified, and the same shall be paid out of the 
appropriate treasury. 
(2) Transcripts from electronic recordings in the circuit court produced by 
the official court transcriber shall be governed in like manner as provided for 
in this section, and compensation shall be at the same rates as provided for in 
§ 78-56-4. 
78-56-9. Trial fee. 
A reporter's fee of $15 shall be collected by the clerk of the court, in each 
case, upon the filing of the case, and may be taxed as costs in the action; no 
reporters' fee shall be charged or collected in probate matters, unless the same 
are contested; then the fee shall be paid by the party contesting. Reporters' 
fees so collected by the clerk shall be transmitted quarterly to the state trea-
surer. In no case shall the state be liable for such fee. 
78-56-10. In circuit court — Appointment — Transcripts of 
evidence. 
Any judge of any circuit court may appoint a competent shorthand reporter 
to report the proceedings in any case, or utilize electronic recording of the 
proceeding upon the request of any party to the action. Whenever the testi-
mony of any witness in any such case shall be stenographically reported by 
such shorthand reporter,or electronically recorded, and thereafter said wit-
ness shall die, or be beyond the jurisdiction of the court, any party to the 
record may read in evidence the testimony of said witness, when duly certified 
by such reporter to be correct, or when the electronic record is accepted by the 
court to be correct, in any subsequent trial of, or proceeding had in respect of, 
the same cause, subject only to the same objections that might be made if said 
witness were testifying in open court. 
78-56-5. Assistant reporters — Duties — Compensation. 
The judge may appoint an assistant reporter to act in the place of the 
regular reporter when the absence, sickness or disability of the court reporter, 
or the business of the court, requires it. The assistant reporter shall qualify in 
the same way, perform the same duties, receive the same compensation and 
collect the same fees as is prescribed for the court reporter; provided, that the 
assistant reporter shall receive compensation only for the time he is actually 
engaged in such work; and provided further, that when he is appointed owing 
to the absence of the court reporter the assistant reporter shall be paid out of 
the salary of the regular reporter, except when such absence is on account of 
the sickness of the regular reporter, when such compensation shall be paid out 
of the state treasury at the same rate and in the same manner as the regular 
reporter's salary is paid. The judge shall certify the compensation due the 
assistant reporter to the state auditor. 
78-56-6. Certified transcripts prima facie correct. 
A transcript of a reporter's notes, written in longhand or typewritten, certi-
fied by him as being a correct transcript of evidence and proceedings, is prima 
facie a correct statement of such evidence and proceedings. 
78-56-7. Oath — Bond — Action on bond. 
Before any such reporter enters upon the discharge of his duties, he shall 
take, subscribe and file the constitutional oath, and give a bond with suffi-
cient surety, conditioned for the faithful performance of his duties, in the sum 
of $2,500, or such larger sum as the judge shall fix. Said bond shall run to the 
state of Utah, but an action thereon may be maintained by any person whose 
rights are affected by the failure of the reporter to perform his official duties. 
78-56-8. Transcripts — Order by court or by party — Im-
pecunious defendant in criminal case — Tran-
script from electronic recordings. 
(1) In a case where a transcript has been ordered by the court, the fees for 
transcribing must be paid by the respective parties to the action or proceeding 
in equal proportion, or by such of them and in such proportion as the court in 
its discretion may order. In no case shall a transcript be taxed as costs, unless 
ordered either by a party or by the court. The reporter shall not be required in 
any civil case to transcribe his notes until the fees for this are tendered to 
him, or a sufficient amount to cover the same is deposited in court for that 
purpose. The party ordering the reporter to transcribe any portion of the 
PART VII 
COURT REPORTERS AND STENOGRAPHERS 
CHAPTER 56 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
78-56-1.1. District courts — Appointment. 
The court administrator shall appoint a certified shorthand reporter with 
the approval of the district judge to report the proceedings in each division of 
the district courts. The certified shorthand reporters shall hold office during 
the pleasure of the court administrator, and the district judge. 
78-56-2. Duties of shorthand reporter. 
The shorthand reporter shall attend all sessions of the court, and take full 
stenographic notes of the evidence given and of all proceedings of each session, 
except when the judge dispenses with his services in a particular cause or for a 
portion of the proceedings. The reporter shall file with the clerk forthwith the 
original stenographic notes required to be taken at a trial or hearing, and, 
when requested, shall with reasonable diligence furnish the defendant in a 
criminal cause, and a party to a civil cause, a transcript of the stenographic 
notes of the evidence and proceedings, or any part of it, upon payment of the 
fees as provided. 
78-56-3. Compensation — Traveling expenses — Fre-
quency of payment. 
The compensation of a court reporter shall be fixed in accordance with 
salary schedules for state employees for attendance upon the sessions of the 
court. He shall also be paid for traveling expenses actually and necessarily 
incurred in the performance of his duties outside the county in which he 
resides. Such compensation and expenses shall be certified by the judge to the 
state auditor, who shall draw his warrant upon the state treasurer for the 
78-56-4. Compensation — Transcripts and copies. 
The compensation of a court reporter for transcribing into longhand or 
typewriting his stenographic notes of evidence and proceedings, or any part 
thereof, shall be 800 per folio for an original, and 200 per folio for additional 
copies, when furnished to the party initially ordering the transcript. If two or 
more parties to an action are to be furnished a copy, the reporter shall receive 
30# per folio for the first copy furnished each party, and 200 per folio for each 
additional copy furnished that party, provided all copies are ordered before 
the reporter commences the first transcription of his notes. 
58-1-11. License application. 
(1) Each license applicant shall apply to the division in writing upon forms 
prepared and furnished by the division. Each application shall contain proof of 
the particular qualifications required of the applicant, shall be verified by the 
applicant, and shall be accompanied by the appropriate fees. 
(2) Before any person is issued a license under this title, all requirements 
for that license as established under this title and by rule shall be met. 
(3) If all requirements are met for the specific license, the division shall 
issue the license. 
58-1-12. Reciprocal license. 
The division may issue a license without examination to a person who has 
been licensed in any state, district, or territory of the United States or in any 
foreign country, whose education, experience, and examination requirements 
are, or were at the time the license was issued, equal to those of this state. 
Before any person may be issued a license under this section, he shall produce 
satisfactory evidence of his identity and good standing in his occupation or 
profession. 
77-1-6, Rights of defendant. (1) In criminal prosecutions the defend-
ant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(b) To receive a copy of the accusation filed against him; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(d) To be confronted by the witnesses against him; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses 
n his behalf; 
(f) To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict where the offense is alleged to have been committed; 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and 
(h) To be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be 
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail 
and if the business of the court permits. 
(2) In addition: 
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense; 
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or 
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received; 
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor 
a husband against his wife; and 
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon 
a plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial 
by jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, unon a inHcrmpnt hv 
ADDENDUM B 
BROOKE C. WELLS, #3421 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS, #25 02 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
JUDGMENT, CONVICTION AND 
SENTENCE AND/OR FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
District Court No. CR86-887 
Supreme Court No. 880161 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
COMES NOW, RALPH LEROY MENZIES, by and through counsel, 
BROOKE C. WELLS, FRANCES M. PALACIOS, JOAN C. WATT, and RICHARD G. 
UDAY, and moves the Court to set aside the judgment and conviction 
for Criminal Homicide, Murder in the First Degree, a capital 
offense, and the sentence of death entered on March 23, 1988, or, 
alternatively, to grant a new trial of both the guilt and penalty 
phases in the above-captioned case. This motion is made pursuant to 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1987) and Rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure (1989) on the following grounds: 
1. The transcript of proceedings prepared in this case 
does not accurately reflect the proceedings held in the trial court 
as demonstrated in the attached examples. 
2. Failure to provide an accurate transcript of 
proceedings in a capital homicide case violates Mr. Menzies' rights 
to appeal pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah; 
to due process of law pursuant to Article I, § 7 of the Constitution 
of Utah; to uniform operation of the laws pursuant to Article I, 
§ 24 of the Constitution of Utah and equal protection pursuant to 
Article I, § 2 of the Constitution of Utah; to effective assistance 
of counsel pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah; 
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment or punishment inflicted 
with unnecessary rigor pursuant to Article I, § 9 of the 
Constitution of Utah; to have the right to a jury trial in a capital 
case remain inviolate pursuant to Article I, § 10 of the 
Constitution of Utah; as well as Defendant's statutory rights, 
including his right to appeal (Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 (1982)), 
right to assistance of counsel on appeal (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-2 
(1953 as amended)), and right to be provided with an accurate 
transcript of proceedings (Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-5 (1988)). 
3. Failure to provide an accurate transcript of 
proceedings in a capital homicide case violates Mr. Menzies' rights 
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to appeal, due process and equal protection of the laws pursuant to 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States; his right to 
effective assistance of counsel pursuant to Amendment VI of the 
Constitution of the United States; and his right to be free from 
cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Amendment VIII of the 
Constitution of the United States. 
4. Ex parte supplementation of the transcript by the 
State without the presence, knowledge or consent of defense counsel/ 
Defendant or the trial judge after entry of judgment violates 
Mr. Menzies1 rights to appeal pursuant to Article I, § 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah; to due process pursuant to Article I, § 7 of 
the Constitution of Utah; to confront witnesses against him and to 
have effective assistance of counsel pursuant to Article I, § 12 of 
the Constitution of Utah; to an inviolate jury trial in a capital 
case pursuant to Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of Utah; to 
uniform application of the laws pursuant to Article I, § 24 of the 
Constitution of Utah and equal protection pursuant to Article I, § 2 
of the Constitution of Utah; and to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment under Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of Utah; to 
appear and defend in person or by counsel (Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 
(1953 as amended)); and various other statutory rights. 
5. Ex parte supplementation of the transcript by a 
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prosecutor without the presence, knowledge or consent of defense 
counsel, Defendant or the trial judge violates Mr. Menzies1 rights 
to appeal, due process and equal protection pursuant to 
Amendment XIV of the Constitution of the United States; to confront 
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel 
pursuant to Amendment VI of the Constitution of the United States; 
and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to 
Amendment VIII of the Constitution of the United States. 
6. The condition of the transcripts makes it impossible 
for the Utah Supreme Court to perform its required function of 
automatically reviewing death penalty cases as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-206(2) (1953 as amended), § 76-3-207(4) (1953 as 
amended), and § 77-35-26(10) (Supp. 1988) as outlined in State v. 
Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 459 U.S. 988 
(1982); and as further defined in State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 
551-3 (Utah 1987), and State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 
(Utah 1989). 
Mr. Menzies respectfully requests that this Court, based 
on the supporting documents, set this matter for an evidentiary 
hearing and oral argument and thereafter set aside judgment, 
conviction and sentence entered on March 23, 1988 and/or order a new 
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trial as the result of the inaccurate record and/or improper 
supplementation by the State, 
DATED this jo day of November, 1989. 
¥m^ BROOK I 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
<0-(.td*M 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney^nr Defendant/Appellant (M IARD G . UDA\3 Attorney for Defendanfe^Appellant 
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NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, Conviction and Sentence and/or for New 
Trial will come on regularly for hearing on the V^L day 
of Aluji**JkiA. t 1989, at the hour of ^/;0Q ^ J , before the 
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Third District Court Judge, Please govern 
yourselves accordingly. 
DATED this /ST day of November, 1989, 
L, 
JROOKE C. WELLS 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
h^JnJAjcu^ 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
<7k.e.u)aix 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney^-i-e-r D e f e n d a n t / A p p e l l a n t 
IARD G. UDA1 
A t t o r n e y f o r D e f e n d a r y t / A p p e l l a n t 
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this day of November, 1989. 
NOV 15 195f-
DELIVERED B> 





SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
January 3# 1990 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
CRAIG LUDWIG 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
24 0 EAST FOURTH SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Ralph Leroy Menzies, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Appellant's motion to file an overlength brief is granted, 
not to exceed 200 pages. Appellant's motion for an extension of 
time to file his opening brief is granted, the same to be filed 
within 60 days after the record is settled; and appellant's motion 
to have the trial court conduct the Rule 11 proceedings is granted 
and the case is remanded for the purpose of: 
1. Resolution of the issues pertaining to the court reporter. 
2. Settlement of the record in the context of the issues 
presented in each of the motions before this Court, and 
otherwise determine the adequacy of the record. 
3. Resolution of defendant's motion for a new trial. 
In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to rule on the 





Geoffrey J. Butler, Clerk 
ADDENDUM D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : CASE NO. CR-86-887 
vs. : SUPREME COURT NO. 88 0161 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
This matter came on for hearing on the 6th day of July, 
1990. Present for the State of Utah was Barbara Bearnson from 
the Attorney General's Office, and Richard G. MacDougall from 
the County Attorney's Office, and defendant was present and 
represented by Richard G. Uday, Joan C. Watt, Elizabeth 
Holbrook, and also present were Brooke C. Wells and Frances M. 
Palacios. The purpose of this hearing was to either reconsider 
the Court's ruling orally issued on June 4, 1990, or in the 
alternative to clarify in writing the oral ruling it made on 
June 4, 1990 requiring trial counsel to meet and review the 
transcript of the above-captioned case. The Court having 
reviewed the materials submitted, hereby enters its ruling. 
STATE V. MENZIES PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
1. Defendant's Motion for New Trial based on Ms. Tauni 
Lee's Utah licensure status is denied. Based on testimony and 
evidence the Court feels although she was not licensed as a 
court reporter for the State of Utah, she was de facto 
qualified to report this trial based on her training, testing 
and experience. 
2. Based on the testimony and evidence, the Court rules 
that the burden is on the defendant/appellant to establish that 
the record is incorrect and that if there are any errors, the 
errors cannot be corrected with due diligence and further that 
such errors are prejudicial even after correction. 
3. Procedure for examining the transcript's accuracy: 
(a) Ms. Lee will proofread in detail the transcript 
at the Utah Law and Justice Center by July 20, 1990. A 
representative of the State of Utah and the defendant may be 
present at this time. Since this is essentially a mechanical 
procedure of Ms. Lee proofreading the record along with her 
notes, it is not necessary that a record be made by a court 
reporter. 
(b) Subsequently, representatives, preferably trial 
counsel, should complete an independent review of the 
transcript and identify any errors or omissions. This should 
be completed by September 21, 1990. 
STATE V. MENZIES PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(c) Any errors, discrepancies, omissions or other 
matters will be heard in open court on September 24, 1990 
starting at 9:00 a.m. A determination will be made by the 
Court if there are errors or omissions and whether such errors 
or omissions can be corrected, and also whether such errors or 
omissions are prejudicial to the extent that a complete and 
accurate record cannot be made for review by the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah. The defendant, Mr. Ralph Leroy Menzies, 
shall be present at this hearing. 
4. The legal basis for the Court's decision is its 
obligation to reconstruct the record where there may be 
problems with the transcript. Whetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47 
(1972) . 
5. After the review process, the burden of proving the 
inaccuracies of the transcript will be on the 
defendant/appellant. 
6. The Court will make a determination that the 
presumption of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-56-6 (1953 as 
amended), that the transcript is correct will be made after the 
review process as above noted, prior to the time the transcript 
is prepared for submission to the Supreme Court for appellate 
review. 
STATE V. MENZIES PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
7. All objections requested by defendant as to the 
procedure taken by the Court will be noted as a standing 
objection throughout these proceedings, 
8- Finally, because this is a capital case which is 
extremely important both for the defendant and the State of 
Utah, the Court requests the cooperation and indulgence of all 
parties in order that we may efficiently and properly conclude 
this matter in the shortest time possible. 
. / * 
Dated this (n ~~ day of July, 1990. 
ADDENDUM E 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAN R. LARSEN (4865) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
DEC 2j> .... 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
ORDER 
District Court No. CR86-887 
Supreme Court No. 880161 
Judge fc^u-ii g T'TIMII*J 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing pursuant 
to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on December 19, 
1990, at the hour of 8:30 a.m. Defendant was present with 
counsel Joan C. Watt, Richard G. Uday, Brooke C. Wells and 
Frances M. Palacios. The State was represented by Dan R. Larsen, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Richard G. MacDougall, Deputy 
Salt Lake County Attorney. Based upon the Court's full review of 
the original transcripts, the evidence presented at the Rule 
11(h) hearing on December 3, 1990, and the considerable time and 
effort expended in an attempt to correct alleged errors in the 
transcript, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED as 
follows: 
1. Defendant's Renewed Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
and/or for New Trial is denied. 
2. The original transcript, prepared by the 
notereader, shall be transmitted to the Utah Supreme Court based 
upon the finding that despite numerous errors, the original 
transcript is sufficiently accurate to afford defendant a full 
and fair review of his issues to be raised on appeal. 
3. The California transcript, interlineated by 
defendant's counsel and containing Ms. Tauni Lee's version of her 
reporter notes, shall also be transmitted to the Utah Supreme 
Court as part of the record pn appeal. 
DATED 
BY THE COURT: 
this 3-* day of b&CriLM#£AJ 199(2-
X Jc^e 
Form: 
IYMONC S. UNO ' 
T h i r d D i s t r i c t C o u r t J u d g e 
\ CERTIFY THAT THfS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF 
UTAH. 
DEPUTY COLRT CLERK CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing Order was mailed, postage prepaid, to Richard G. Uday, 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, 





Norman H Bangerter 
Governor ,J 
David L Buhler j 
Executive Director 2 
David E Robinson 
Division Director 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIftN OF RECORDS 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained 
by the Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
reveals whether an official certified shorthand reporters license has ever 
been issued to: Tauni D. Byrd aka Tauni D. Lee, and whether such license, if 
any, is current or has expired. 
It is hereby certified that no license was or has been issued by this 
office for Tauni D. Byrd aka Tauni D. Lee. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by 
virtue of Title 58 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper 
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere 
they would be in my control and possession. 
This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in 
compliance with RULE 44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 1st day of 
December, 1989. 
George P. Weiler, License Coordinator 
Utah State Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Heber M Wells Bu Id ng 
160 East 300 South/P 0 Box 45802 
Salt Lake City Utah 84145 0802 
(801)530-6628 
MAY 1 7 1990 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 




IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT (IN RESPONSE TO 
STATE'S AFFIDAVIT OF GEORGE P. 
WEILER DATED MAY 10, 1990) 
District Court No. CR86-887 
Supreme Court No. 880161 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
I, GEORGE P. WEILER, declare under penalty of perjury that 
the following is true and correct: 
1. I am the License Coordinator of the Utah State Division 
of Occupational & Professional Licensing; I have been so employed 
for the last fifteen years. 
2. As Coordinator of the Utah State Division of 
Occupational & Professional Licensing, I supervise the licensing for 
ten professional boards. 
3. One of the ten professional boards that I supervise is 
the Certified Shorthand Reporters Licensing Board. 
4. On May 10, 1990, I signed an Affidavit prepared by the 
State in the above-entitled case. 
(a) In point five (5) of that Affidavit, I 
indicated three ways in which applicants could obtain a 
Utah Certified Shorthand Reporter license. The statutory 
authority I relied on for that statement is Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-1-12 (1985). 
(b) Both points five (5) and six (6) of that 
Affidavit state that Ms. Lee "could" or "would" have been 
accepted for licensure in Utah. By way of clarification, 
such acceptance is not automatic but must necessarily have 
been accomplished only after Ms. Lee made formal 
application to become a Utah licensed Certified Shorthand 
Reporter. The requisite application process requires the 
applicant to provide proof of any out-of-state licensure 
relied on by the applicant and to provide satisfactory 
evidence of good standing in the profession. Because 
Ms. Lee did not apply for a Utah license, no such 
information was presented for review by the licensing 
agency. 
- 2 -
DATED t h i s day o f May, 1990 
w/sMe 
GEORQg P. WEILER 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN TO before me this 
1990. 
JlS* ay of May, 
My Commission Expires: 
«?•/•- ?/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 6
Residing in Salt Lake City, Utah 
NOTARY PUBUC 
AUCtA A. REEVES 
180 E. 300 So. 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
^ E * ' STATE OP UTAH 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and the 
Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, this / "7 day of May, 1990. 
ADDENDUM G 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 880161 
Priority No. 1 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SfiMAweA/ro) 
I, RICK BLACK, declare under penalty of perjury that the 
following is true and correct: 
1. I am the Executive Officer of the California Certified 
Shorthand Reporters Board. 
2. The California Certified Shorthand Reporters Board is 
the licensing agency for Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State 
of California and is located at 1021 "O" Street, Room A-153, 
Sacramento, California 95814, telephone (916) 445-5101. 
3. As Executive Officer, I am familiar with the 
record-keeping system of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State 
of California and am able to research the records to determine the 
license status of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State of 
California. 
4. I am acquainted with Tauni D. Lee, aka Tauni D. Byrd. 
Ms. Lee was originally licensed as a Certified Shorthand Reporter in 
California. In July of 1985, she was assigned the license number 
6770. 
5. Ms. Lee's California Certified Shorthand Reporter 
license expired and became delinquent in April of 1987. Ms. Lee 
remained unlicensed as a Certified Shorthand Reporter in California 
from that date until April of 1989 when she renewed the same. 
6. Ms. Lee has had numerous problems in the State of 
California regarding the timeliness and quality of her work. She 
has been served with four Orders to Show Cause by the Court of 
Appeals of the State of California, First Appellate District, for 
transcription problems. Ms. Lee has been declared not competent to 
act as a Certified Shorthand Reporter by that court, and she has 
been sanctioned several times as well. See Golden Oak Enterprises, 
Inc., Et Al. v. Manor Development Co., Inc., Et. Al.; Cindy Lee 
Hebbring v. Jess Eugene Hebbring; Santiago Nunez v. Hedwig Young, 
et al.; and Henry, et al v. Savelli. 
7. As the licensing agency in the State of California for 
Certified Shorthand Reporters, the Attorney General's Office of the 
State of California represents us in any matters regarding 
licenses. Our office has requested the Attorney General of 
California to file an Accusation against Ms. Lee in preparation for 
a formal disciplinary hearing regarding her California Certified 
Shorthand Reporter's license. 




SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /3 day of 
December, 1989. 
- i s . ^ , • » . . ^ ^
 A ^ ^ n ^ 
OFFICIAL S€AL 
DAVID C NOREN 
HJTA&YPU8UC CALIFORNIA 
SACRAMENTO COUNTY 
tfrSOWMISSlQN EXPIRES A(J8 23.1991 
My Commission Expires; 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in 
SrtC/2 Amgr/y/T-O County, California 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this day of December, 1989. 
ADDENDUM H 
COURT OF APPEAL OP THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
By. 
F I L E D 
APR 13 1988 
Court Qf Appeal • First App. [ 
R O N D . B A R R O W 
DEPUTY 
GOLDEN OAK ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. vs. MANOR DEVELOPMENT CO., 
INC., ET AL., A037262, Division One, Sonoma County No. 123722 
CINDY LEE HEBBRING vs. JESS EUGENE HEBBRING, A038187, Division Pive, 
Napa County N~. 48395 
BY THE COURT: 
TAUNI BYRD, Official Reporter (or Official Reporter Pro 
Tempore) for the Superior Courts, Counties of Sonoma and 
Napa, respectively, is hereby declared not competent to 
act as an Official Reporter in^any'courVof any county 
within the jursidiction of the State of California, 
pursuant to Government Code section 69944. 
Dated 
APR 1 3 1888 
lOV/, P.J. 
p. J , 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I declare that on April 21f 1988 I served the attached order in 
said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid/ in the United States 
mail at San Francisco, California addressed as follows: 
Tauni Byrd, CSR, % H Dixon Hindley, Clerk, 240 East 400 South/ 
P.O. Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Tauni Byrd/ 798 E. 7440 South/ #20/ Hidvale# Utah 84047 
Division of Registration, P.O. Box 5802, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110 
Donald Jones, President, Utah Shorthand Reporters Association, 
2223 East 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Jim Campbell 
Deputy Clerk 
TATE OF CAUFORNIA 
louxt txi Appeal 
FIRST OiSTRJCT 
STATE BUILDING 
FRANCISCO. CA 94102 
L5 i ^ r - i c!"'- * •:• 
s£j • \\ 
cj 
,. £uuM*J-
JAMES R, BRIGHTON, AOMIN. ASST. 
oepunes 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Court of Appeal 
§tate of California 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
RON D. BARROW. CLERK 
May 2 7 , 1988 
SAN FRANCISCO 94102 
4 154 STATE BUILD4NG 
CIVIC CENTER 
537-1894 
OtANA ClNL CHIEF DEPUTY 
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PENNY KEELEY. SECRETARY 
Ronald W. Gibson 
Deputy Court Administrator 
State of Utah 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
230 South 500 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dear Mr, Gibson: 
In answer to your letter of May 11, 1988 concerning Court 
Reporter Tauni Byrd, Ms. Byrd was declared not competent to act 
as an official reporter in California due to her failure to timely 
file transcripts in the cases of Golden Oak Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Manor Development Co., Inc. (A037262) and Marriage of Hebbring 
(A038187). 
In the case of Golden Oak Enterprises, an order to show 
cause was issued directing Ms. Byrd to appear before this court 
to explain her f*_j_l HT-P +r> fjlg fchg^j:^^jziB±^ in a timely fashion 
and a sanction of $100 was imposed for the lateness in excess of 
one men "£5T When she failed to pay the sanction, the court declared 
her not competent to act as a court reporter in California. 
In the case of Marriage of Hebbring, the same circumstances 
arose because of late filing of the transcripts. Her tardiness was 
in excess of three months and she did not respond to requests to 
produce the transcripts. She failed to appear after the issuance 
of an order to show cause and was sanctioned $600, and declared 
not competent: to act as a cour- reporter in California. 
The sanctions have now been paid and the transcripts have 
been filed. In order for her to be declared competent again to 
act as a court reporter in California, Ms .„_Byxd-must-submit a 
request to this court for her reinstatement as a court reporter 
Page 2 
Ronald W. Gibson 
in good standing together with any supporting documents she wishes 
to attach. This court would then act on that request. 
Very tpily you^s, 
RON D. BARROW 
Clerk of the Court 





























JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General 
of the State of California 
JEANNE C WERNER 
Deputy Attorney General 
California Department of Justice 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 6200 
San Francisco, California 94102 
Telephone: (415) 464-3787 
Attorneys for Complainant 
BEFORE THE 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS BOARD 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In the Matter of the Accusation 
Against : 
TAUNI D. (BYRD) LEE 
401 North 900 East #26 
Provo, Utah 84601 
C e r t i f i e d Shorthand Reporter's 




The Complainant alleges: 
PARTIES 
1. Complainant, Richard J. Black, is the Executive 
Officer of the California State Certified Shorthand Reporters 
Board (hereinafter the 'Board") and brings this accusation 
solely in his official capacity. 
2. On or about July 5, 1985, Certified Shorthand 
Reporter's License No. CSR 6770 was issued by the Board to Tauni 
D. Byrd, whose name later became Tauni D. Lee (hereinafter 
"respondent"). Said license expired in a delinquent status on 




























through April 30, 1990. The address of record on file with the 
Board is: 401 North 900 East #26, Provo, Utah 84601. 
JURISDICTION 
3. This accusation is brought under the authority of 
section 8025 of the California Business and Professions Code 
(hereinafter "Code"), which provides that the Board may suspend 
or revoke a certificate under certain circumstances, including: 
(c) Fraud, dishonesty,... willful violation of duty; 
gross incompetency in practice or unprofessional conduct, (which) 
includes... acts contrary to professional standards concerning... 
filing and retention of notes... delivery, execution and 
certification of transcripts...and any provision of law 
substantially related to the duties of a certified shorthand 
reporter; 
(d) Repeated unexcused failure, whether or not willful, 
to transcribe notes of cases pending on appeal and to file the 
transcripts thereof within the time required by law or to 
transcribe or file notes of other proceedings within the time 
required by law or agreed by contract; and 
(e) Violation of this chapter (Business and Professions 
Code, Division 3, Chapter 13. Shorthand Reporters) or the rules 
and regulations adopted by the board. 
4. Section 8024.2 of the Code provides that each 
certificate holder must notify the Board in writing of any change 
of address. 
5. Section 8016 of the Code requires that persons who 




























official reporter or pro tempore official reporter of any court, 
as defined in the Government Code, are required to have a 
certificate in full force and effect issued by the Board. The 
Government Code sets forth additional requirements for official 
court reporters in Articles 9-12, commencing with Section 69941. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
6. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under 
section 8025 of the Code in that she failed to file a transcript 
in a timely manner as required by law. The circumstances are as 
follows: 
A. On or about May 26, 1987, transcripts were 
requested in Marin County Municipal Court Action No. V8770367 
(Henry v. Savelli). Respondent provided an estimate on July 15, 
1987, received and cashed a check shortly thereafter, and the 
transcript was filed late, on February 17, 1988. 
7. Incorporating by reference the allegations in 
paragraph 6 above, cause for discipline exists in that said 
conduct constitutes the willful violation of duty; gross 
incompetency; and acts contrary to professional standards 
regarding the availability, delivery and execution or 
transcripts, all in violation of Section 8025(c). 
8. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 6 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action 
under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct 
constitutes the repeated unexcused failure to transcribe a 




























SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION 
9. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under 
section 8025 of the Code in that, in two appeals pending in the 
First Appellate Division, Fifth District, of the California Court 
of Appeal, she failed to file transcripts in a timely manner as 
required by law. The circumstances are as follows: 
A. The transcripts in Napa County Case No. 48395 
(Hebrina) and Sonoma County Case No. 123722 (Golden Oak) were 
both filed late in the Court of Appeal. The Hebrina transcript 
was requested in July 1987 and was filed on February 24, 1988. 
The Court of Appeal, after granting repeated requests for 
extension of time, imposed sanctions of $500 in the Hebrina case 
and $100 in the Golden Oak case. On April 13, 1988, the Court 
filed an order declaring respondent not competent to act as an 
Official Reporter in any court of any county in California, 
pursuant to Government Code section 69944. Said Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A and is incorporated herein as though 
fully set forth. Said order of incompetency has not been 
rescinded nor has respondent petitioned the court for 
reinstatement. 
10. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 9 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action 
under section 8025(c) of the code in that said conduct, with 
respect to each case, constitutes unprofessional conduct; the 
willful violation of duty; and gross incompetency in practice. 
11. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 




















under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct, with 
respect to each case, constitutes the repeated unexcused failure 
to transcribe notes of cases pending on appeal and to file the 
transcripts thereof within the time required by law. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
12. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action in 
that, in the case Walsh v. The Pool Scene, Inc., Marin Municipal 
Court Case No. V891687, she reported said case on October 4, 
1989, and, after having been repeatedly requested to prepare a 
transcript in preparation for the next scheduled hearing in the 
matter, did so only after obtaining an advance of $475.00, far in 
excess of the actual cost of said transcript. She then refused 
to deliver the transcript to the requesting attorney, Nancy P. 
McCarthy, leaving it finally with another party, and has refused 
to date to reimburse Ms. McCarthy's client for an overpayment in 
said case. 
Respondent represented to Ms. McCarthy that the cost 
was $341.50, which is in excess of the amount allowable pursuant 
20 I to Government Code section 69950 (70 cents per folio [100 
21 words],given that respondent's price for a 101 page transcript 
22 would equal 4.83 folios per page when the maximum that can 
23 physically be typed on a 28-line page is 3.5 folios per page. 
24 The actual amount charged should be no more than $265.00 and may 
25 in fact be significantly less, as Ms. McCarthy's estimate, having 
26 I reviewed the completed transcript, is $141.40. 
27 
13. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 12, respondent has subjected her certificate to 
discipline in that said conduct violates section 8025(c) in that 
it constitutes fraud; dishonesty; the willful violation of duty; 
unprofessional conduct; and/or the violation of Government Code 
section 69950; and is contrary to professional standards 
regarding delivery and execution of transcripts. 
14. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 12 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action 
under section 8025(d) of the code in that said conduct 
constitutes the repeated unexcused failure to transcribe a 
proceeding within the time required by law or by contract. 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
15. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 9 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action 
under section 8025(c) of the code in that she served as an 
official court reporter pro tempore in Santa Clara County during 
a period beginning in March 1990, through April 19, 1990, 
notwithstanding the order of the Court filed April 13, 1988 
(Exhibit A) declaring her incompetent to do so. Said conduct is 
unprofessional conduct, violates the law, and is fraudulent and 
dishonest. 
16. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraphs 9, and 12 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary 
action under section 8025 (c) of the code in that she served as 
an official court reporter pro tempore in Marin County in October 
1 111989, notwithstanding the order of the Court filed April 13, 1988 
2 I (Exhibit A) declaring her incompetent to do so. Said conduct is 
3 unprofessional conduct, violates the law, and is fraudulent and 
4 dishonest, 
5 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
6 17. Respondent has subjected her certificate to 
7 discipline under sections 8025(e) in conjunction with 8024.5 of 
8 the code in that she has failed to notify the board in writing of 
9 her change in address. Respondent's address of record on file 
10 with the Board is as alleged in paragraph 2 above, whereas in 
11 truth and in fact, respondent was living in California and 
12 working as a court reporter in California in October 1989 and 
13 April 1990, as alleged in paragraphs 12 and 15 above. 
14 18. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
15 paragraphs 9, 12, and 15, respondent has subjected her 
16 certificate to discipline under section 8025(c) for 
17 I unprofessional conduct in that her failure to notify the board of 
18 I her current California address constitutes misrepresentation 
19 and/or fraud and/or dishonesty in light of the fact that she is 
20 residing and working as an official court reporter pro tempore in 






















WHEREFORE, the complainant requests that a hearing be 
held on the matters herein alleged, and that following said 
hearing, the Board issue a decision: 
1. Revoking or suspending Certified Shorthand' 
Reporter's License Number CSR 6770, heretofore issued to 
respondent Tauni D. (Byrd) Lee; 
2. Taking such other and further action as the Board 
deems proper. 
DATED: QjChrf\ if MP 
t \LkjK^ju&MrfAjAJA RICHARD J. BLACK /Executive Officer B^oard of Certified Shorthand Reporters 
Department of Consumer Affairs 




COURT Or APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
F I L 0 I 
Courf sf A t p s ^ , fist App 
R W C T B A R R O 
"•"—£-?UT 
GOLDEN OAK EN? 
INC., ET AL. 
N C , ET AL. vs. MANOR DEVELOPMENT CO., 
vision One, Sonoma Councy No. 123722 
CINDY LEE HEBSRiT?G-vs. JESS EUGENE HE33RING, A038187, Division Five, 
Napa County N~. 48395 
BY THE COURT: 
TAUNI BYRD, Official Reporter (or Official Reporter Fro 
Tempore) for the Superior Courts, Counties of Sonoma and 
Napa, respectively, is hereby declared not competent to 
act as an Official Reporter in any court of any councy 
within the jursidiction of the State of California, 
pursuant to Government Code section 69944. 
Dated APR i 3 m 
. / 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY KAIL 
I declare that on April 13, 1988 I served the attached order in 
said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States 
mail at San Francisco, California addressed as follows: 
Office of the County Clerk, Sonoma County Superior Court, 600 
Administration Drive, Santa Rosa, California 95401 
Eeve T. Lewis, County Clerk, Hall of Justice, 600 Administration 
Drive, Box 1419, Santa Rosa, California 95402 
Tauni Byrd, CSR, % H Dixon Hindley, Clerk, 240 East 400 South, 
P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Steven Hargrove, 1555 Marlow Road, Santa Rosa, California 95401 
Richard Black, Executive Director, Certified Shorthand Reporters 
Board, 1020 "N" Street, Sacramento, California 95814 
Jim Campbell 
Deputy Clerk 
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
F I I E C 
Court 9f3Q?2l 
GOLDEN OAK ENTERPRISES, INC., ET AL. vs. MANOR DEVELOPMENT v.^ . , 
INC., ET AL., A037262, Division One, Sonoma County No. 123V^2 
CINDY LEE HE3BRING vs. JESS EUGENE HES3RING,! AO 38187,'') Division Five, 
Napa County No. 48395 -v 
BY THE COUR3 
TAUNI BYRD, Official Reporter (or Official Reporter Pro 
Tempore) for the Superior Courts, Counties of Sonoma and 
Napa, respectively, is hereby declared not competent to 
act as an Official Reporter in any court of any county 
within the jursidiction of the State of California, 
pursuant to Government Code section 69944. 
Dated APR 1 3 m 
^rUi^ 
P b 5 7 SCTd-Da i 
RECEIPT FOP. CERTIFIED MAIL 
GOLDEN OAK EN-ERPRISI ^ 
INC., ET AL., A03726.^ 
CINDY LEE HEBBRING v ^ l 
N a P a County No. 4339 ^ g 
RNIA F I L E I 
lest'Cteo De»»*ef? ^**' 
Re!y»n Recent sno-^i 
:o *rof» J^S Oa:e Oe-
Return R*ce«Ot $no *•«•:; •*? *"*""• 
0a!«? arz Aac**s w* Ce--*r'. 
O T A L Postage a^a f w ? 
JLOPMEN7, 
NO. 123 
37^, D: v i s i o n F i v e , 
Po»tf-a'» 3; U**:e' 
Dated 
APR 1 3 «88 i/kA}^ 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I declare that on April 13, 1988 I served the attached order in 
said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed 
envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States 
mail in San Francisco, California addressed as follows: 
Office of the County Clerk, Napa County Superior Court, Post 
Office Box 880, Napa, California 94559 
Tauni Byrd, 798 e. 7440 SO. #20, Midvale, Utah 84047 
Janice F. Norton, County Clerk, Courthouse, Room 3, Post Office 
Box 880, Napa, California 94559 
Diane Erickson, 825 Brown Street, Room 200, Napa CA 94559 
Richard Black, Executive Director,Certified Shorthand Reporters 






























JOHN K. VAN DE KAMP, Attorney General 
of the State of California 
JEANNE C. WERNER 
Deputy Attorney General 
California Department of Justice 
2101 Webster 
Oakland, CA 94612-3049 
MAILING ADDRESS: 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 6200 
San Francisco, California 94102 
Telephone: (415) 464-3787 
Attorneys for Complainant 
BEFORE THE 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTERS BOARD 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
In t h e Mat te r of t h e Accusation 
A g a i n s t : 
TAUNI D. (BYRD) LEE 
401 North 900 East #26 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Certified Shorthand Reporter's 
License No. CSR 6770, 
Respondent 
NO. 88-03-0426 
MOTION TO AMEND 
ACCUSATION AND PROPOSED 
AMENDMENT 
The Complainant, Richard J. Black, Executive Officer of 
the California State Certified Shorthand Reporters Board, 
requests that the accusation in this matter be amended as follows 
to conform to the proof adduced in the hearing on this 




























documents on file in tne comx or Appeal m runner support oi 
this motion. 
FOR AN ADDITIONAL CAUSE OF ACTION 
19. Respondent is subject to disciplinary action under 
section 8025 of the Code in that, in yet another appeal pending 
in the First Appellate Division, Fifth District, of the 
California Court of Appeal, she failed to file transcripts in a 
timely manner as required by law. The circumstances are as 
follows: 
A. The transcript in Marin County Case No. 121365, 
Nunez v. Young, (A039760) was filed nearly five months late. The 
notice of appeal was filed August 27, 1987. The transcript was 
filed in compliance with the Court of Appeal's June 28, 1988 
Order to Show Cause. Respondent was ordered to pay a sanction of 
$500 to the Clerk of the Court for filing the transcript late. 
20. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 19 above, multiple causes for disciplinary action is 
established under section 8025(c) of the code in that said 
conduct constitutes unprofessional conduct; the willful violation 
of duty; and gross incompetency in practice. 
21. Incorporating by reference the allegations of 
paragraph 19 above, respondent is subject to disciplinary action 




















constitutes the repeated unexcused failure to transcribe notes o 
cases pending on appeal and to file the transcripts thereof 
within the time required by law. 
DATED : ^ W ^ ^ f if 10 . 
03587110SF88AD1936 
/RICHARD J . BLACK 
E x e c u t i v e O f f i c e r 
Board of C e r t i f i e d S h o r t h a n d R e p o r t e r s 
Depar tment of Consumer A f f a i r s 
S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a 
Compla inan t 
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE 




YOUNG, HEDVIG, ET AL. 
A039760 
Marin County No. 121365 
BY THE COURT: 
TAUNT. BYRD is delinquent in payment of the $500 sanction 
imposed in Che above entitled action on August 9, 1988 (copy 
attached). Ms. Byrd should pay the sanction or submit a 
reasonable schedule of payment for this Court's approval. The 
sanction should be paid or Che schedule submitted by February 15, 
1989, otherwise contempt procedures will be initiated, which 
could lead to the issuance of a WARRANT OF ATTACHMENT (ARREST). 
**•* * "-vf** *•.. ~-" v* "*»•*• zcr •*"" r* /^,fi,« 
«• : * * ••* 
Dated 3'M 1 3 &lSa 
K 
PUTT 
LOW, PJ. P. J 
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
IN AND FOR THE 




YOUNG, HEDWIG, ET AL. 
A039760 
y.ann County No. 121365 
IF O L E 
AUG-01988 
HON c. OAnncv 
BY THE COURT: 
TAUNI BYRD, having f i l e d the transcript in compliance with 
t h i s c o u r t ' s Order to Show cause of June 28, 1988, i s hereby 
ordered to pay a sanction of $500. , for f i l i n g the transcript 
nearly 5 months l a t e . This sanction should be paid to the Clerk 
of the Court of^Appealf on or before September 15, 1988. 
The aforementioned Order to Show Cause of June 28, 1988, i s 
hereby discharged 
D/Y O * . ~u> 
Dated 
AUG 9 S88 (I 
K'MG, J. ACIIHG 




COURT OF APPEAL OP THE STATE 01' CAUI'OKNIA 
'IN AND FOR THE 
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT 
DIVISION FIVE 
SANTIAGO NUNEZ, A MINOR 
v . 
KEDWIG YOUNG, ET AL. 
A039760 
Marin County No. 121365 P/ 
FILED 
JUN2SI988 
Court cf App:3l • to App. Dfrf. 
KON D. BARROW 
DIPUTY 
BY THE COURT: 
Tauni Byrd, having been declared not competent to act as an 
Official Reporter in the State of California by this Court's 
Order of April 13, 1988, (copy attached) is hereby ordered to 
appear and show cause before this Court on July 22, 1988, at 9:00 
a.m., why sanctions should not be imposed upon her for her 
failure to file, in a timely manner, the transcript in the above 
entitled case, A copy of the notice of appeal filed August 27, 
1987 is attached. 
If Ms. Byrd completes and files her transcript with the Marin 
County Clerk on or before July 20, 1988, she then need not appear 
on July 22, 1988, as ordered above, and the matter will be 
submitted for disposition. Should Ms. Byrd not file the 
transcript and not appear before this Court on July 22, 1988, she 
may be declared in contempt of court and a WARRANT OP ATTACHMENT 
(ARREST) may issue, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Sections 
1212-1216. 
This order is made pursuant to the Court's power to control the 
conduct, of its ministerial officers. (Code Civ. Proc, section 
128, subd. (a) (5); see also, Malick v. Contra Costa Flood Control 
Dist. (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 50, 52.) 
• Xr4 n ~Axaow cum c« "vr zojtrr y A».»O-. 
J» * v- of ».'.u-c-w»« * P «rr A*<»tLL*-i c.-3-»-rr oo 
Dated 
JUN 2 8 S88 




PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
I declare that on January 13, 1989, I served the attached order 
in said cause, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a 
sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United 
States 
mail at San Francisco, California addressed as follows: 
Office of the County Clerk, Marin County Superior Court, Hall of 
Justice, Civic Center, Post Office Box E, San Rafael, California 
94903 
Tauni Byrd, 798 E. 7440 So. #20, Midvale, Utah 84047 
Tauni Bvrd, Ih. Dixon Hindley, Clerk, 240 East 400 South, P.O. 
Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Division of Registration, P.O. Box 5802, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84110 
Donald Jones, President. Utah Shorthans Reporters Association, 
2223 East 1300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Ronald W. Gibson, Deputy, Administrative Office of th Courts of 
the State of Utah, 230 South 500 East, 0300, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84102 
Howard Hanson, Court Administrator, Hall of Justice, 3ox E, 
Civic Center, San Rafael, California 94903 
Richard Black, Executive Director, Certified Shorthand Reporters 
Board, 1020 "N" Street, Sacramento, California 95814 
Jim Campbell 
Deputy Clerk 
JOAN C. WATT, #3967 
RICHARD G. UDAY, #5355 
ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 53 2-5444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 




Case No. CR86-887 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, : Supreme Court No. 880161 
JUDGE RAYMOND S. UNO 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
) ss: 
COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO ) 
I, RICK BLACK, declare under penalty of perjury that the 
following is true and correct:' 
1. I am the Executive Officer of the California Certified 
Shorthand Reporters Board. 
2. The California Certified Shorthand Reporters Board is 
the licensing agency of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State 
of California and is located at 1021 "O" Street, Room A-153, 
Sacramento, California 95814, telephone (916) 445-5101. 
3. As Executive Officer, I am familiar with the record 
keeping system of the California Certified Shorthand Reporters 
Board and am able to research the records to determine the license 
status of Certified Shorthand Reporters in the State of California. 
4. I am acquainted with the license file of Tauni D. 
Lee, aka Tauni D. Byrd. Ms. Lee was originally licensed as a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter in California by having been assigned 
license number 6770 in July, 1985. 
5. Ms. Lee currently has no legal ability to act as an 
official court reporter in the state of California because: 
a. On April 13, 1988, the Court of Appeal, First 
Appellate District, 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Room 5154, 
San Francisco, California, 94102, telephone (415)557-
9850, issued an order declaring Ms. Lee "incompetent to 
act" as an official court reporter in any court in the 
state of California. The order has not been vacated, and 
thus Ms. Lee has not had legal authority to act as a 
reporter in any court of California since the order was 
issued on April 13, 1988. 
and 
b. As a result of Ms. Lee's failure to pay her 
license renewal fees, her license became "delinquent" on 
April 30, 1990. 
6. Richard J. Black, Executive Officer for the 
Certified Shorthand Reporters Board of the State of California, has 
initiated proceedings to revoke Ms. Leefs license by serving an 
Accusation on Ms. Lee to revoke her license as a certified 
shorthand reporter. 
7. A "default" hearing on the revocation proceedings, 
which Ms. Lee did not attend, was held before an Administrative Law 
Judge on November 6, 1990. 
8. It is anticipated that the administrative law judge 
will issue a Proposed Decision to the California Certified 
Shorthand Reporters Board, and that the Board will adopt, reject, 
or modify that decision concerning revocation of Ms. Lee's license. 
9. In the event that Ms. Lee is dissatisfied with the 
final decision of the Board, she is entitled to appeal the decision 
in the Superior Court. 
day of DATED this 1990. 
(l^A^J JWt 
RICHARD J. BLACK 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO b e f o r e me t h i s ^ ' f day of 
A / ^ V xr/ Jzjr~s~ , 1990. 




> ' / v v ^ v w ^ v 'm*Jt M 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in 
Sacramento County, California 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
and the Attorney General's Office, 236 Sate Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114, this day of , 1990. 
ADDENDUM J 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300 
SALT L\K£ CITY. UTAH 84102 
(801)533-6371 
6/J-
GORDON R. HALL 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
CHAIRMAN. JU0K2AL COUNCIL 
WILLIAM C. VICKREY 
STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
M E M O R A N D U M 
RONALD W. GIBSON 
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
JOHN F. MCNAMARA 
JUVEN8-E COURT 
ADMINISTRATOR 
TO: Chief Justice Gordon R. Hall 
Presiding Judge Scott Daniels 
District Judge Raymond Uno 
Court Reporter Tauni (Byrd) Lee 




DATE: vMay 17, 1988 
RE: Official Court Reporter Tauni (Byrd) Lee 
On May 6, 1988 jfr. Geoff Butler, Supreme Court Clerk, 
related to me a conversation he had with Tauni (Byrd) Lee regarding 
preparation of the trial transcript in the case'of The State of Utah 
vs. Ralph Lerov Menzies. No. 880161, currently before the Supreme 
Court on appeal. During the course of the conversation Mr. Butler 
indicated that Ms. (Byrd) Lee estimated that it^would require 
approximat ely_j_jgn_th3_to ^ prepare H:£ejt rigs crip t:, ^ that her_husband 
was >eing_.jtransferred_to J£urope„and^that she intended_to_resign her 
employment in Utah and join him_in about 2 months. 
We noted that the transcript was of a Capital case which has 
been identified by the Supreme Court as the number one priority of 
the court and mutually expressed our concern- regarding the extensive 
tise requested for preparation of the transcript as well as the 
complication associated with Ms. (Byrd) Lee leaving the country 
prior to the completion of the transcript. Mr. Butler inquired 
whether the Judicial Council rule governing court reporters.permits 
placing a reporter on leave with pay in order to permit 
concentration on the transcript and thus expedite its preparation. 
I informed him that the rule prohibits granting such leave. 
On Monday, May 9, 1938, I received a telephone call from 3rd 
District Presiding J_udge_jScott J)anieis who expressed his grave 
concerns regarding the report edifice"' anticipated for preparation of 
the transcript in this case and of the indication that Ms. (Byrd) 
Lee was intending to leave the country before its completion. Judge 
Daniels requested that we do all that is possible administratively 
Chief Justice Hall 
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to ensure that the transcript is prepared timely and before the 
reporter terminates employment in order to avoid any possibility of 
jeopordizing the appeal. 
Subsequently, I presented the issue to Bill Vickrey who 
concurred with the Sentiment of Judge Daniels in recognizing the 
urgency and unique nature of the circumstances surrounding this 
particular situation. Bill indicated that the preparation of the 
transcript must supersede any other consideration. He suggested 
that administrative rules should not interfere with finding a 
solution to a problem in a particular case. 
On May 12, 1988 I met with Tauni (Byrd) Lee to discuss the 
matter. She indicated that an offer to place her on full time leave 
with pay would not alleviate the problem nor contribute to 
expediting the preparation of the transcript because of the process 
she utilizes for prepartion of all of her transcripts. As I 
understand it, she delivers discs of her notes to a note reader and 
typist, who she employees, who in turn prepares the draft transcript 
for Ms. Lee to proof read and correct. The note reader is employed 
part time in a law firm and is available to work on the transcript 
only every other week. Ms. Lee indicates that she can only proceed 
at the speed of the note reader and that no other options are 
available. 
In response to my request for a plan to reduce the time of 
preparation of the transcript, Ms. Lee estimates^_that^ it,_will 
£oi^i_st;„oX_approximately 5,000 pages, and that if she could devote 
full time every other week to proof reading and correcting the draft 
on alternating weeks when the note reader would prepare the draft 
that they could produce a maximum of 625 pa,ges-~each week and thus 
have the full transcript filed by July 23. 1988. She also stated 
that her husband's reassignment had been postponed and she was not 
planning to move for six months. This plan would result in reducing 
the time required to prepare the transcript from the original 
estimate of 9 months to 3 months. 
Although the placing of a court reporter onJLeave with pay 
status foT the~purpose of transcript preparation is prohibited by 
the Judicial^nTolihcil^Rule^~Y~ fee,! compelled to do so in tEHF 
instance.„ With reluctance" at violating a'"Judicial CounciT"Eule T 
have approved placing__MsJt__Lee on leave with pay for the weeks 
beginning on May 23rd, June 6th, June 20th~July 4th, and July 15th 
conditioned upon the assurances thac the schedule will be met. I do 
so due to the urgency and uniqueness of the circumstances as well as 
the nature of this particular case which justifies treating the 
matter as an exception to the rule. It is not intended to establish 
a presidence for other cases. 
Chief Justice Hall 
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This problem is recurring and increasingly frustrating to 
resolve. It is indicative of the numerous problems confronting 
judges and administrators in attempting to manage the system. J&e 
concept of the Judicial Council—rule - is -sound -and is -designed to 
avoid doubJje^.CPjnpgnsatiQn_of->j:eporter3 .by payment .of „a_state_salary 
during periods when the reporter, is preparing^a_transcript_forjrtiich 
JL separAte_j^e is_also—.charged. Nevertheless, the * competing 
interests of court duties, transcript preparation and private 
outside depositions continues. Examples of related problems are 
obtaining the cooperation of some reporters in accepting assignments 
to other courts when the need arises and in allowing their outside 
work to interfere with court responsibilities. The ability to 
regulate the system is unfortunately compromised by our drastic 
reduction in applicants for reporter positions demonstrated by some 
present vacancies which we cannot fill. Although many reporters are 
dedicated professionals who commit themselves to their 
responsibilities, the problems persist. I am hopeful that the 
Judicial Council's Task force on the court reporting system can 
develop some proposed solutions to avoid interruption of the courts' 
business because of these issues. 
0426R 
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mivb luMciai ^istrtri OJouri 
RAYMOND S. UNO. JUDGE 
COURT BUILDING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
August 29, 1988 
Ms. Tauni Lee 
O f f i c i a l Shorthand Reporter 
Me t ropo l i t an Hall of J u s t i c e 
240 East 400 South 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Dear Tauni : 
Sever£ l_J^ tha t 
have increased the concern surrounding your a b i l i t y to complete 
t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of the t r a n s c r i p t in t h e appea l of State v. 
Menzies in a t imely manner. 
Under t h e e x i s t i n g a g r e e m e n t wi th you , you have been 
r e l i e v e d of your o f f i c i a l d u t i e s as the r e p o r t e r for Judge Uno on 
a l t e r n a t e weeks, but allowed to r ece ive f u l l pay so t h a t you may 
d e v o t e more u n i n t e r r u p t e d t i m e t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e 
t r a n s c r i p t . However, you have chosen not to p resen t yourself a t 
t he cour thouse for work on the t r a n s c r i p t so t h a t supervision by 
your judge and cour t execut ive has become imposs ib le . Moreover, 
your f requent absences during those a l t e r n a t e weeks when you are 
a s s i g n e d to p e r f o r m your o f f i c i a l d u t i e s has become an 
unaccep tab le burden upon your iudqe , fellow cour t reDor te rs . and 
t h e c o u r t execu t ive . 
T h e r e f o r e , e f f e c t i v e immediately, we a re r e l i ev ing you of 
your a s s i g n m e n t to Judge Uno u n t i l t h e c o m p l e t i o n of t h e 
t r a n s c r i p t in S t a t e v . Menzies. You w i l l cont inue to receive 
f u l l pay, You a r e d i r e c t e d to appea r a t t h e A d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
_Off ic_e_o.f.. the^Co.gjiLsL^ 300^J3l£t<^^ n 
August 3 0.~.be-tween— the - hour-S--o£~~84-0~0L_a ^m.., aad~3:.0 0Up*jiL*,_ and 
t h e r e a f t e r _ _ u n t i l . . t h e completion, o f„ th ,e_J : ranscr ip t . You are to 
work e x c l u s i v e l y on the ^ t r a n s c r i p t unde^-Hi^he^dir^c.fer^supe^y.ision. 
o*=:Sorn?ta&frbsjon-. You a r e d i r e c t e d to p resen t for Mr. Gibson's 
i n s p e c t i o n tha t por t ion of tne t r a n s c r i p t t h a t has been prepared 
to d a t e . Ycu are to present: to Mr. Gibson on a weekly basis that 
p o r t i o n of cne t r a n s c r i p t prepared during t h a t week. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
Raynfond S. Urto^  
District Court Judge 
Timothy'M. Shea 
Trial Court Executive 
Tnird Judicial District Cour 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102 
(801)533-6371 
GORDON R. HALL 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
CHAIRMAN. JUDK3AL COUNCIL 
WILLIAM C. VICKREY 
STATE COURT AOMiNlSTRATOR M E M O R A N D U M -
Vickrey 
Gibson 
RE: Tauni Lee, Off ic ia l Shorthand Reporter 
DATE: August 30, 1988 
TO: William 
FROM: Rotial 
RONALD W. GIBSON 
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR 





On Tuesday, August 30, 1988, I met with Tauni Lee "in my 
office pursuant to the letter of August 29, 1988, signed by Judge 
Raymond Uno and Court Executive, Timothy Shea (copy attached). At 
that time I provided Mrs. Lee with a copy of the letter and reviewed 
its contents with her. 
I informed Mrs. Lee of the discussions I had during the week 
of August 22nd with Presiding Judge Scott Daniels, Judge Raymond Uno/ 
and Timothy Shea regarding Mrs. Lee's poor job performance. Those 
complaints included repeated tardiness and absences from work, 
confrontations with other reporters and court clerks leading to 
morale problems within the court and a violation of the security 
policy by providing key and card allowing access to the secure 
parking area and the building to her husband. 
I confirmed with Mrs. Lee that portion of the letter which 
relieves her of her assignment to Judge Uno. We also reviewed the 
directives contained in the letter regarding her appearance in this 
office daily until completion of transcripts due to the Supreme 
• Court and the inspection of the progress in preparation of those 
transcripts. 
Mrs. Lee informed me that the State v. Menzies transcript 
was nearing completion and gave me her assurance that it, together 
with the State v. Wjnsr.ess transcript, would be filed with the 
Supreme Court on or before September 6, 1988. She further informed 
me that the transcripts are prepared on her computer which is 
situated ir^  her^iogre^7gid7^'th'at''"transporting' it jto_this_office*~would 
be cumbersome, time consuming, and serve no purpose in view of the 
limited time remaining for their completion. 
Mrs. Tauni Lee 
August 30, 1988 
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Mrs. Lee also indicated that,she has had_axailable two .weeks.-
j i i _ J l g £ X £ ^ u r ^ ^ judicial 
£onferences of which time she believes two days should be credited 
toward her, annual leave. She also was absent August 25th and 26th 
and 29th on annual leave. In addition, she_^lans^jto-^*travel^*to 
California on September_9L-.thru.l,6f 1988 
It is my judgment, and I so indicated to Mrs. Lee, that 
because there only remains three working days (excluding Labor day, 
today and Tuesday the 6th) involved it is unreasonable to require 
her to appear daily in this office and relocate her computer for 
that short period, ^authorized her to continue preparation of the 
transcripts at her home^^and^report to this office on Tuesday, 
September "6," 1988J ^folj^ving_ the
 tfilliig^Sr^the -transcripts or her 
appearanceJ^i.ox£-th£L^UB«me^ojurjE7 At ~thaV~meeting, I will inform 
hereof her employment status after~consultation with Judge Daniels, 
Judge Uno, Tim Shea and yourself. 
IP 
cc: Judge Scott Daniels 





tHljirtr aiubtetal district Court 
RAYMOND S. UNO, JUDGE 
COURT BUI'-DING 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
September 7, 1988 
Ms. Tauni Lee 
Official Shorthand Reporter 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Tauni : 
E f f e c t i v e immedia te ly , you are terminated from employment 
with the Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . As you a r e now under the 
supe rv i s ion of Mr. Ron Gibson, you are to provide to Mr. Gibson 
a l l cour thouse keys and your magnetic parking card immediately. 
You may use today and Thursday to remove any personal items from 
your o f f i c e . 
P r i n c i p a l among t h e grounds for t h i s terminat ion is your 
h a b i t u a l t a rd ines s and absenteeism. Records show that since May 
198 8 you have been absent , considerably more than any,.,o.thec—.court 
j e p o r t e r . This has become an u n a c c e p t a b l e burden upon your 
j udge , fe l low court r e p o r t e r s , and the cour t execu t ive . Also, 
the unprofess ional manner in which you conduct y o u r s e l f i s a 
m a t t e r of concern. Your a t t i t u d e towards judges and staff has 
become i n d i f f e r e n t . You have been slow ..to.-giihmifc t r a n s n r i p*"*, 
y e t demand acce le ra ted payment by the county. In one incident 
you refused to answer a c a l l to court although you were in your 
o f f i c e . F i n a l l y , l o a n i n g your magnet ic pa rk ing card to an 
unauthor ized person was a breach of s e c u r i t y , and your reaction 
to the c l e rk who reported the incident was inappropr i a t e . Such 
conduct is not f i t t i n g of an off icer of the c o u r t . 
S i n c e r e l y , 
Raymond S. Uno Timothy M. Shea 
Third District Judge Trial Court Executive 
Third Judicial District 
TMS:jsh 
c c : Honorable Gordon R. Hall 
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2. All evidence seized pursuant to 
the search warrant must be suppressed 
since the warrant was acquired in bad 
faith. 
3. Even if this Court finds no fault 
in the probable cause determination, 
the search of Mr. Menzies' residence 
pursuant to the warrant fails because 
of the prior, illegal confirmatory 
search. 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE ILLEGALLY 
SEIZED WAS NOT HARMLESS BEYOND A REASONABLE 
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POINT VII. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
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A. CONFRONTATION 
1. Unavailability 
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c. Rule 35 Hearing 
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POINT X. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN QUASHING 
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POINT XI. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
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PROCESS AND STATUTORY RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY IN 
FAILING TO INFORM DEFENSE COUNSEL THAT TIM 
LARABEE HAD DIFFICULTY IN SELECTING 
MR. MENZIES FROM THE PHOTO ARRAY. 
POINT XIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
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POINT XIV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL WHEN EVIDENCE OF 
MR. MENZIES7 PAROLE STATUS REACHED THE JURY 
THROUGH A STATE WITNESS IN VIOLATION OF AN 
EXPRESS COURT ORDER. . . . 
A. TESTIMONY REGARDING MENZIES7 
CRIMINAL HISTORY WAS INADMISSIBLE. 
B. THE PROSECUTION TEAM COMMITTED 
MISCONDUCT. . 
1. Deliberate injection of 
inadmissible evidence by one of the 
State7s chief witnesses qualifies as 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
2. The detective7s statement 
constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. 
C. PREJUDICE . . . 
D. MENZIES7 STATE AND FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED. . . 
1. Impartial Jury 
2. Due Process and Fair Trial 
3. Right to Confrontation . . 
4. The trial court violated 
Mr. Menzies7 right to take the stand, 
E. THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED MR. MENZIES7 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
BY NEITHER GRANTING A MISTRIAL NOR 
CAUTIONING THE JURY AFTER THE JURY HEARD 
UNFAIRLY PREJUDICIAL AND INADMISSIBLE 
EVIDENCE OF MR. MENZIES7 PAST CRIMINAL 
HISTORY 
1. The trial court violated 
Mr. Menzies7 right to an untainted 
jury. 
2. The trial court violated 
Mr. Menzies' state and federal 
constitutional rights to a fair 
trial. 
3. The trial court deprived 
Mr. Menzies of his right to 
confrontation. 
4. The trial court violated 
Mr. Menzies7 right to take the stand. 
POINT XV. APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL 
BY A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY. 
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
B. ARGUMENT 
POINT XVI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY 
ADMITTED SEVERAL ITEMS OF "REAL" EVIDENCE. . . 
A. HANDCUFFS, HANCUFF BOX AND NICKED 
TREE THEORY 
B. HOUSEHOLD ITEMS—APPLIANCE CORD, 
THREE PIECES OF ROPE 
C. TENNIS SHOES 
D. TEN-CODE 
E. JOGGING JACKET 
F. MENZIES' JACKET 
G. TROY DENTER'S CAR 
POINT XVII. CUMULATIVE ERRORS OCCURRING IN 
THE GUILT/INNOCENCE PHASE OF THIS TRIAL DENIED 
MR. MENZIES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO A 
FAIR TRIAL. 
POINT XVIII. THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A VERDICT. 
A. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY NECESSARY 
ELEMENT OF AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT. . . . 
1. The evidence was insufficient to 
establish that Mr. Menzies illegally 
took or detained Ms. Hunsaker. . . . 
2. The evidence was insufficient to 
prove that Mr. Menzies illegally took 
or detained Ms. Hunsaker against her 
will with intent to engage in 
felonious behavior. 
3. The evidence is insufficient to 
prove Mr. Menzies illegally took or 
restrained Ms. Hunsaker against her 
will with intent to harm her. . . . 
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE EVERY ELEMENT OF 
ROBBERY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. . . . 
C. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE 
LINKING MR. MENZIES TO THIS CRIME. . . . 
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POINT XIX. THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
FEDERAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AGAINST 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND VIOLATED 
UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 AND COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING PHOTOGRAPHS 
OF MS. HUNSAKER'S CORPSE. 
A. THE COURT ADMITTED STATE'S EXHIBITS 
6 AND 7 OVER OBJECTION BY APPELLANT. . 
B. THE ADMISSION OF THESE PHOTOGRAPHS 
VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 403 AND 
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS 
AND AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
1. The photographs had no probative 
value. 
2. The photographs were unfairly 
prejudicial. 
3. The fact that the photographs 
were admitted during the penalty 
phase, which was tried to the bench, 
does not dissipate the harm caused 
by the improper admission of the 
photographs. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF THESE UNFAIRLY 
PREJUDICIAL PHOTOGRAPHS VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS 
AND AGAINST CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHTS TO 
DUE PROCESS AND TO BE FREE FROM CRUEL AND 
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT AND WAS PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR 
POINT XX• THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
MR. MENZIES' PRISON RECORDS SINCE MR. MENZIES7 
RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS IN THE CONTEXT OF A 
CRIMINAL CHARGE WERE NOT PROTECTED IN COMPILING 
SUCH RECORDS. 
A. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . 
1. During the penalty phase, the 
State submitted Appellant's prison 
records over objection. 
2. The prison records contain 
numerous allegations from numerous 
declarants of crimes for which 
Appellant has not been convicted 
and of other bad acts allegedly 
committed by Appellant. . . . . 
B. STANDARDS OF DUE PROCESS APPLYING IN 
PRISON ADMINISTRATION DEMONSTRATE THAT 
PRISON RECORDS SHOULD NOT BE ADMISSIBLE 
IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. . . . . . . . . 
1. Different state interests govern 
prisons and criminal prosecutions, 
resulting in different standards of 
due process. 
2. Due process is frequently 
inapplicable in prison administration, 
3. The standards of due process that 
do not apply in prison administration 
fall far below the standards reguired 
in a criminal trial. . . . . . . . . 
POINT XXI. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON RECORDS 
VIOLATED THE HEARSAY RULE. WHICH. BY VIRTUE OF 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND AGAINST 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. MUST APPLY TO THE 
PENALTY PHASE OF A CAPTIAL SENTENCING 
PROCEEDING. ' 
A. THE PRISON RECORDS WERE ADMITTED IN 
VIOLATION OF THE HEARSAY RULE 
B. DUE PROCESS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
REQUIRE THE APPLICATION OF THE HEARSAY 
RULE TO THE PENALTY PHASE OF A CAPITAL 
TRIAL 
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS IN THE PRISON FILES WAS 
REVERSIBLE ERROR 
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POINT XXII. ADMISSION OF THE PRISON RECORDS 
VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION. 
A. THE STATE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES A 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION DURING THE PENAIT\ 
PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE. 
B. THE ADMISSION OF THE PRISON RECORDS 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION PROVIDED BY ARTICLE I, 
§ 12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
1. The prosecution made no shoving 
that any of the prison record 
declarants were unavailable. . . . . 
2. The hearsay statements included 
in the prison record were not 
proven reliable. 
POINT XXIII. ADMISSION OF THE ENTIRE PRISON 
RECORD VIOLATED MR. MENZIES' RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES A 
RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION DURING THE PENALTY 
PHASE OF A CAPITAL CASE 
B. THE ADMISSION THE PRISON RECORDS 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
CONFRONTATION PROVIDED BY THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 
POINT XXIV. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL CONDUCT VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL AND STATE RIGHTS TO DUE 
PROCESS AND AGAINST CRUEL. UNUSUAL AND UNDULY 
RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT AND ALSO VIOLATED 
ARTICLE I. S 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITTUTION. . . 
A. DURING THE PENALTY PHASE OF 
APPELLANT'S TRIAL, THE STATE ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OF UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL 
CONDUCT OVER OBJECTION 
B. THE ADMISSION OF THIS EVIDENCE 
VIOLATED THE EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 
AS EXPLAINED IN STATE V. LAFFERTY. 
C. THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF 
UNADJUDICATED CRIMES VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH, 
EIGHTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO 
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING UNADJUDICATED 
CRIMINAL CONDUCT AN AGGRAVATING FACTOR 
VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207; 
ARTICLE I, § 5 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; 
AND STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST CRUEL, UNUSUAL AND 
UNNECESSARILY RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT. . . . 
POINT XXV. IN RELYING ON NUMEROUS CLINICAL 
EVALUATIONS OF APPELLANT, WHICH WERE 
CONDUCTED WHILE APPELLANT WAS IN CUSTODY, THE 
COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION. 
POINT XXVI. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO 
PROVIDE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF PENALTY PHASE 
WITNESSES AND EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS TO FEDERAL DUE PROCESS AND TO NOTICE 
UNDER ARTICLE I. S3 7 AND 12 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION AND UTAH RULE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 16. , 
A. THE RECORD RELATING TO NOTICE IN THE 
PENALTY PHASE IS INCOMPLETE BUT DOES 
INDICATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE IN THE PENALTY PHASE, OVER 
OBJECTION BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, RELATING 
TO LACK OF NOTICE OF THE EVIDENCE. . . . 
1. The prosecution was under a 
duty to disclose police reports, 
written and recorded statements of 
Appellant, criminal record of 
Appellant, and penalty phase 
witnesses. 
2. Defense counsel repeatedly 
objected to the prosecution's failure 
to fulfill its obligations to disclose 
evidence referred to in the discovery 
request and court order. 
3. The State presented numerous 
witnesses and much evidence in 
violation of the discovery request 
and court order for a witness list. 
B. IN ADMITTING THIS EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION 
OF APPELLANT'S DISCOVERY REQUEST AND THE 
TRIAL COURT'S ORDER TO DISCLOSE PENALTY 
PHASE WITNESSES, THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S FEDERAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY 
RIGHTS TO NOTICE DURING THE PENALTY PHASE. 
1. Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 16 
2. Federal Due Process . . . . . . 
C. RIGHT TO NOTICE UNDER THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION . . . . 
POINT XXVII. THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON VICTIM 
IMPACT EVIDENCE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S FEDERAL 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST CRUEL. UNUSUAL AND UNNECESSARILY 
RIGOROUS PUNISHMENT. 
A. THE COURT IN THIS CASE IMPROPERLY 
ADMITTED VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN 
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO DEATH 
B. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION PROHIBITS THE CONSIDERATION 
OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE IN DEATH PENALTY 
CASES. . 
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE VICTIM IMPACT 
EVIDENCE VIOLATED ARTICLE I, § 9 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE VICTIM IMPACT 
EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL 
POINT XXVIII. IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
UNADJUDICATED CRIMINAL ACTS. THE TRIAL COURT 
VIOLATED THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
GOVERNING THOSE ACTS AND APPELLANT'S RIGHTS 
TO DUE PROCESS. 
POINT XXIX. THE ERRORS COMMITTED DURING THE 
PENALTY PHASE WERE PREJUDICIAL AND REQUIRE 
REVERSAL OF APPELLANT'S DEATH SENTENCE. . . 
POINT XXX. THE ADMISSION OF THE EXPERT OPINION 
OF DR. PATRICIA SMITH DURING THE PENALTY PHASE 
OF MR. MENZIES7 TRIAL. WHICH OPINION WAS IN 
PART BASED ON UNRELIABLE INFORMATION. VIOLATED 
MR. MENZIES7 RIGHTS UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
AND ARTICLE 1.5 9. 
POINT XXXI. MR. MENZIES7 DEATH SENTENCE MUST 
BE REVERSED BECAUSE IMPROPER AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES WERE PRESENTED TO AND RELIED ON 
BY THE TRIAL COURT CONTRARY TO FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS. 
A. STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES 
MUST BE CHARGED AND FOUND IN THE GUILT/ 
INNOCENCE PHASE OR THEY CANNOT BE 
INTRODUCED IN THE PENALTY PHASE HEARING. 
B. SUBSECTIONS (f), (i) AND (q) WERE 
IMPROPERLY APPLIED TO THE FACTS OF THIS 
CASE AND REQUIRE THAT THE DEATH SENTENCE 
BE VACATED. . . . . . . . . . . . 
1. Subsection ff) 
Subsection (i) 
3. Subsection (q) . . 
C. THE ERRONEOUS INTRODUCTION OF 
SUBSECTIONS (f), (i) AND (q) INTO THE 
SENTENCING DETERMINATION OF THE PENALTY 
PHASE DEMANDS REVERSAL OF THE DEATH 
SENTENCE ORDERED TO BE IMPOSED ON 
MR. MENZIES 
Page 
POINT XXXII. MR. MENZIES' SENTENCE SHOULD BE 
REVERSED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY 
APPLIED THE WOOD STANDARD. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE EVIDENCE IN AGGRAVATION OUTWEIGHED 
EVIDENCE IN MITGATION BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
1. The trial court's finding was 
induced by an erroneous view of the 
law, . 
2. The trial court's finding was 
without adequate evidentiary support. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
DEATH IS THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY 
1. The trial court's finding was 
induced by an erroneous view of the 
law. 
2. The trial court's finding was 






























DURING THE COURSE OF THSES 15-MINUTE BREAK. 
WE WILL RESUME AGAIN IN 15 MINUTES. 
-fl&y~ 
(RECESS.) 
?HE COURT: OKAY. OUR REGULAR REPORTER RAN 
3-. 
4 te 6 A > H ^ 
^ . 
INTO A LITTLE DIFFICULTY,AND CAN'T MAKE IT BACK, SO WE HAVE 
A SUBSTITUTE, MR. CARLTON,WAY, WHO IS JUDGE RIGTRUP'SM?~ 
REPORTER WHO HAS GRACIOUSLY CONSENTED TO ASSIST US IN OUR 
TIME OF DIRE NEED. 
THE JURORS HAVE BEEN SELECTED WHO HAVE BEEN tM 
REVIEWED AND CHALLENGES MADE. AND SO THE NAMES OF THOSE / 
THAT I READ WILL BE THOSE WHO WILL REMAIN HERE, AND WILL 
SERVE ON THE JURY PANEL. AND THOSE WHOSE NAMES ARE NOT 
CALLED MAY BE EXCUSED. 
AND AT THIS TIME, ON BEHALF Or THE STAT 7. OF 
UTAH, THE PLAINTIFF, AND THE DEFENDANT AND THIS COURT, * 
WOULD LIKE TO THANK THOSE WHO ARE NOT SELECTED FOR SERVING 
ON THIM JURY UP UNTIL THIS PARTICULAR TIME. AND HOPEFULLY, 
IN THE PROCESS THAT YOU HAVE LEARNED SOMETHING ABOUT THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE NEED TO BE VERY CAREFUL IN 
TERMS OF SELECTING JUROR.'J FOH Till PARTICULAR CASE. 
IF YOU ARE NOT SELECTED ON THIS JURY PANEL 
THIS TIME, HOPEFULLY YOU WILL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
SELECTED ON ANOTHER CASE, BUT HOPEFULLY THE PROCESS WILL BE 
NOT AS LONG SO THAT YOU WILL NOT BE WORN OUT BY THE TIME 
THAT YOU GET TO SERVE ON THE JURY. 
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1 BUT AS YOU PROBABLY REALIZE, THE CHANGES OF 
2 SERVING ON A JURY ARE VERY SLIM, SO YOU MAY NOT BE CALLED, 
3 AND IF YOU ARE CALLED, YOU STILL MAY NOT BE SELECTED TO 
4 SERVE ON A JURY TO TRY A CASE. 
5 SO IF YOU DO HAVE THAT OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE, 
6 I'M SURE THAT IT WILL BE OF MUCH EDUCATIONAL^VALUE, BOTH TO 
7 YOURSELF AND TO THE COURT. 
8 SO I WILL READ THIS LIST, AND THOSE WHOSE 
9 NAMES ARE NOT CALLED MAY BE EXCUSED. AND YOU DO NOT HAVE 
10 TO RETURN AGAIN. THOSE WHOSE NAMES ARE CALLED, I WOULD 
11 LIKE TO HAVE YOU REMAIN. YOU WILL BE SWORN. 
T2.VCKL-
12 MR. JONES: COULD WE HAVE THE JURORS STAND AS 
13 THEIR NAMES ARE CALLED SO THAT WE ARE SURE IT CORRESPONDS 
14 WITH THE LIST. 
15 THE COURT: FIRST CASE — FIRST JUROR IS 
16 FRANK WALTER OUIMETTE. NEXT IS LARRY TAYLOR. NEXT IS 
17 RONALD CURTIS HICKS. NEXT IS SANDRA J. STROUD. NEXT IS 
18 JAMES L. HAMPSHIRE. NEXT IS JACK MARTIN WALL. NEXT IS 
19 HELENS D. GASS. NEXT IS ROBERT FRANK ARCHULETTA.— 
20 MS. WELLS: JUDGE, I BELIEVE YOU HAVE MISSED 
21 ONE. 
2 2 THE COURT: DID I MISS ONE, 3 3? OKAY. MYRNA 
23 MATULEVICH. AND LET ME SEE. WHERE DID I GET TO? 
2 4 NEXT IS KATHLEEN WINN. NEXT IS NATHAN 
LV.UW (r 
25 WILLIAM ADAMS. NEXT IS LILLIAN,, EATON. NEXT IS KATHY F. 
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1 ROSENKRANTZ. NEXT IS LINDA L. SANDSTROM. THAT-IS IT 
'? 
2 THERE • y* / > * ' - , • 
3 MS-r^WEiLS: YES, YOUR HONOR, AS—WELL—AS ^-:'-r 
4 T H A T - " T H E J URORS—THAT-Y-OU-H-A-VE-SE-LEeT^a^ "^ * > 
5 MR-r—JONES: YES, IT IS. -r^/.\-
6 THE COURT: I GUESS IT'S PROPER AT THIS TIME, 
7 THEN, THAT THE OTHERS BE EXCUSED, AND THEN WE CAN HAVE THE 
8 JURORS SWORN. SO ALL THE OTHERS, I WOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU 
9 VERY MUCH FOR BEIJNG_HERE_KITH.-US 
10 /(THE OTHER JURORS LEAVE THE ROOM.) __,.) -~-^ 
11 THE COURT: THE^'BATLIFF WILL SEAT YOU SO THAT 
12 WHEN YOU COME BACK, YOU MUST REMAIN IN THOSE SEATS ALL THE 
13 TIME SO THAT THE ATTORNEYS WILL KNOW WHO YOU ARE. 
14 IF YOU WI-iL STAND AND BE SWORN. 
15 (JURY SWORN.) 
16 THE COURT: AT THIS TIME, WE WILL EXCUSE YOU 
17 AND TOMORROW MORNING WE WILL PROCEED WITH THE OPENING 
18 STATEMENTS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EVIDENCE. 
19 I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN RESUME AT 10:00 . 
2 0 TOMORROW MORNING, IS THAT CORRECT, OR CAN WE START AT 9:30? 
21 MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR, I HAVE A CONFLICT IN 
2 2 ANOTHER COURT AT* 9:30, AND I DON'T KNOW WHEN THAT WILL BE 
23 FINISHED. 
2 4 THE COURT: WE—WXLL HAVE TO START AT 10:00, 
25 THEN. SO TOMORROW MORNING AT 10:00 O'CLOCK, IF YOU CAN BE 
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1 I HERE BEFORE THAT TIME SO THAT WE CAN RESUME ON TIME, WE 
U-cL '' 
2 I WILL START WITH THE OPENING STATEMENTS, AND THEN WE WILL 
3 PROCEED AS I INDICATED WHEN I WAS EXPLAINING TO YOU THE 
4 PROCEDURES THAT WE WOULD FOLLOW. 
5 IS THERE ANY OTHER MATTERS THAT WE SHOULD 
6 HANDLE AT THIS TIMEZ „ 
7 MK. JOKES-: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
8 THE COURT: IF NOT, I JUST WANT TO ADMONISH 
9 YOU, AGAIN, THAT YOU ARE NOT TO TALK WITH ANY ONE REGARDING 
10 THIS CASE, FAMILY MEMBERS, RELATIVES OR NEIGHBORS OR ANYONE 
11 ELSE. 
12 IF ANYONE SHOULD APPROACH YOU, TELL THEM THAT 
13 YOU ARE ON JURY DUTY AND YOU CANNOT TALK ABOUT THIS CASE. 
14 IF THEY SHOULD PERSIST, WALK AWAY AND REPORT THAT TO THE 
15 COURT, AND PLEASE DO NOT EXPOSE YOURSELF TO ANY PUBLICITY 
16 FROM TELEVISION, RADIO, NEWSPAPERS OR ANYTHING ELSE. IS 
17 THAT UNDERSTOOD? 
18 IF THERE IS NONE — IF THERE IS ANYONE THAT 
19 DOES NOT UNDERSTAND THAT, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND. 
2 0 THE RECORD SHOULD SHOW NO ONE HAS RAISED 
21 THEIR HAND. SO YOU MAY BE EXCUSED FOR THIS EVENING. 
2 2 (JURY IS EXCUSED.) 
2 3 MS-r—WBtLS: YOUR HONOR, WE NEED FOR THE 
2 4 BENEFIT OF THE RECORD THE JURY — YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD JUST 
A ' 



























CAUSE CHALLENGES THAT WE PREVIOUSLY MADE TO JURORS UPON 
WHICH WE DID NOT EXERCISE OUR PRE-EMPTORY CHALLENGES. I 
THINK SPECIFICALLY ALTERNATE NUMBER 1, THAT WE DID NOT 
EXERCISE A PRE-EMPTORY ON THAT. WE DID CHALLENGE FOR 
CAUSE. WE ARE NOT WAIVING THAT ON AN APPEAL ISSUE. 
BUT THE REASON THAT WE DID NOT DO THAT IS J 
GIVEN THE ENTIRE POOL THAT WE HAD BEFORE US, IT WAS OUR 
DECISION THAT PERHAPS THERE ARE OTHERS THAT WE SHOULD TAKE 
OFF GIVEN THEIR ORDER AND THE ENTIRE SITUATION. 
WE WOULD ALSO LIKE THE COURT TO NOTE FOR THE 
—or" 
RECORD THAT THE COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT OUR FOUR CAUSE 
MOTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE JURORS HAS CAUSED US TO 
EXERCISE ON THOSE SAME JURORS. I BELIEVE THERE ARE EIGHT 
OF THEM THAT WE BELIEVE WE EXERCISED PRE-EMPTORIES ON THAT 
WE ORDINARILY WOULD NOT HAVE IF THE COURT HAD GRANTED OUR 
MOTIONS AND, IN FACT, THE DEFENSE ENDS UP HAVING FOUR PRE-
EMPTORY CHALLENGES THAT WE ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE IN A 
CAPITAL CASE. 
AND SO WE BELIEVE THAT THE REQUIREMENT 07 
DOING THAT HAS CREATED AN UNFAIR — HAS CREATED PROBLEMS 
WITH US EXERCISING TO-HAVE A"FAIR AND IMPARTIAL JURY 
BECAUSE WE ARE LIMITED TO FOUR PRE-EMPTORIES. 
THE COURT: THE STATE? 
MR. JONES: NO RESPONSE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. IT WILL BE NOTED FOR THE 
892 
1 I RECORD THOSE OBJECTIONS. OKAY, THEN, TOMORROW AT 10:00 
2 O'CLOCK. WE WILL RESUME THEN. WE WILL BE IN RECESS UNTIL 
3 I THEN. 























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
DEC 3 1990 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH I 
ORIGINAt"" STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, 
Defendant. 
:. ,uu., Cerk 
Case N0. 861908871 
Trial Transcrint, 
Partial, 2-17-88 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 17th day of February, 
I988, at 5:°° o'clock p.m., this cause came on for trial 
before the HONORABLE RAYMOND UNO, District Court, with a 
jury, in the Salt Lake County Courthouse, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the State: 
For the Defendant 
ERNEST W. JONES 
RICHARD G. MAC DOUGALL 
FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
BROOKE C. WELLS 
1 THE COURT:- Okay. Our regular reporter 
2 ran into a little difficulty. She went and she can't 
3 make it back. So, we have astute Mr. Carlson (sic) 
4 Way, who is Judge Rigtrup's able reporter, who has 
5 graciously consented to assist us in our time of dire 
6 need. 
7 The jurors have been selected, who have 
8 been reviewed, and challenges made. And so, the names 
9 of those that I read will be those who will remain 
10 here and will serve on the jury panel. And those 
LI whose names are not called may be excused. And at 
12 this time, on behalf of the State of Utah, the 
13 Plaintiff and the Defendant and this Court, I would 
14 like to thank those who are not selected for serving 
15 on this jury up until this particular time. And, 
L6 hopefully, in the process, that you've learned 
17 something about the criminal justice system and the 
18 need to be very careful in terms of selecting jurors 
L9 for this particular case. 
20 If you are not selected on this jury 
21 panel this time, hopefully you will have an 
22 opportunity to be selected on another case. But, 
23 hopefully, the process will be not as long so that 
24 you'll not be worn out by the time that you get to 
S5 serve on the jury. But, as you probably realize, the 
1 chances of serving on a jury are very slim. So, you 
2 may not be called. And if you are called, you still 
3 may not be selected to serve on a jury to try a case. 
4 So, if you do have that opportunity to serve, I'm sure 
5 that it will be of much education and value both to 
6 yourself and to the courts. 
7 So, I'll read this list, and those whose 
8 names are not called may be excused, and you do not 
9 have to return again. Those whose names are called, 
10 I'd like to have you remain. You will be sworn. 
11 MR. MACDOUGALL: Could we have the 
12 jurors stand as their names are called so we are sure 
13 it corresponds with the list? 
14 THE COURT: First case -- first juror is 
L5 Frank Walter Ouimette; next is Bret Larry Taylor; next 
16 is Ronald Curtis Hicks; next is Sandra J. Stroud; next 
17 is James L. Hamshire; next is Jack Martin Wall; next 
18 is Helen D. Gass; next is Robert Frank Archuletta — 
19 MR. JONES: Judge, I believe you've 
10 missed one. 
11 THE COURT: Did I miss one? 33. Okay. 
22 Myrna Matulevich. And let me see. Where did I get 
13 to? 
> d Next is Kathleen Winn; next is Nathan 
1 Rosenkrantz; next is Linda L. Sandstrom. 
2 Is that it there? 
3 MS. PALACIOS: Yes, Your Honor. 
4 THE COURT: Is that the jurors as you 
5 have selected them? 
6 MR. MACDOUGALL: Yes, it is. 
7 THE COURT: I guess it's proper at this 
8 time, then, that the others be excused. And then we 
9 can have the jurors sworn. So, all the others, I'd 
10 like to thank you very much for being here with us. 
11 The bailiff will seat you so that when 
12 you come back, you must remain in those seats all the 
13 time so that the attorneys will know who you are. 
14 If you could stand and be sworn? 
1 5 (Jury Sworn) 
16 At this time, we will excuse you. And 
17 tomorrow morning we will proceed with the opening 
18 statement and the introduction of the evidence. I 
19 believe that we can resume at 10:00 tomorrow morning. 
> 0 Is that correct? We can start at 9:30 
>1 if --
\2 MS. WELLS: Your Honor, I have a 
\3 conflict in another court between 9:00 and 9:30, and I 
'4 don't know when that will be finished. 
1 10:00, then. 
2 So, tomorrow morning at 10:00 o'clock, 
3 if you can be here before that time so that we can 
4 resume on time. We will start with the opening 
5 statements, and then we'll proceed, as I indicated 
6 when I was explaining to you the procedures that we 
7 wouId foilow. 
8 Is there any other matters that we 
9 should handle at this time? 
10 MR. MACDOUGALL: No, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: If not, I just want to 
12 admonish you, again, that you are not to talk with 
13 anyone regarding this case, family members, relatives 
14 or neighbors or anyone else. If anyone should 
15 approach you, tell them that you are on jury duty and 
16 you cannot talk about this case. If they should 
17 persist, walk away and report that to the Court. And 
18 please do not expose yourself to any publicity from 
19 television, radio, newspapers or anything else. Is 
20 that understood? If there's none -- if there's anyone 
21 that does not understand that, please record? 
22 The record shows no one has raised their 
23 hand. So, you may be excused for this evening. 
24 (Jury Excused) 
1 benefit of the record after the jury --
2 MS. WELLS: Your Honor, we would just 
3 like the record to indicate that we are not waiving 
4 our cause challenges that we previously made to any 
5 jurors upon which we did n.ot exercise our preemptory 
6 challenges. I think, specifically, Alternate No. 1 is 
7 one that we did not exercise a preemptory on that we 
8 did challenge for cause. We are not waiving that on 
9 an appeal issue. 
10 But, the reason that we did not do that 
11 is: Given the entire pool that we had before us, it 
12 was our decision that perhaps there are others that we 
13 should take off given their order and the entire 
14 si tuation. 
15 We'd also like the Court to note for the 
16 record that the Court's failure to grant our for-cause 
17 motions with respect to the jurors has caused us to 
18 exercise on those same jurors. I believe they are 
19 eight of them that we believe we exercised 
20 preemptories on that we ordinarily would not have if 
21 the Court had granted our motion. And, in fact, the 
22 Defense ends up having four preemptory challenges that 
23 we are entitled to exercise in the capital case. And 
24 so, we believe that the requirement of doing that has 
1 being -- exercising and having a fair and impartial 
2 jury, because we are limited to four preemptories. 
3 THE COURT: The State? 
4 MR. JONES: No response. 
5 THE COURT: .Okay. It will be noted for 
6 the record, those objections. 
7 Okay. Then, tomorrow morning at 10:00 
8 o'clock. We will resume then. 
9 We will be in recess until then. 
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